In its most recent communiqué, the Alianza Nacional Constituyente Originaria (ANCO), (National Original Constituent Alliance), has responded to the intention of some groups interested in preserving the current Constitution under the slogan “don't reform it, comply with it”. The pretension of opposing the Constitutional Reform of the regime, delayed until the installation of the new National Assembly in January 2026, maintaining the current constitution, is in the opinion of ANCO, indefensible (see in Spanish ANCO Communiqué, THE 1999 CONSTITUTION IS INDEFENDIBLE. IT IS NECESSARY TO CONVENE THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL POWER - 01-06-2025, in https://ancoficial.blogspot.com/2025/06/comunicado-anco-la-constitucion-de-1999.html).
In this new communiqué, ANCO reaffirms the need to oppose this Constituent Assembly disguised as a reform to the constitutional prerogative of calling for an Original National Constituent Assembly through the mechanisms established in the 1999 Constitution, given that the regime intends to transfer to the communes what is an inalienable right of the Venezuelan people: the exercise of their sovereignty through direct and secret vote. This is already known all over the world, to the point that it is news in the portals of the main centers of political analysis. Crisis Group, an independent international organization specialized in global conflict analysis, reports the following on Venezuela and Maduro's reform proposal:
“With the explicit aim of dismantling “bourgeois democracy”, the reform would transfer power from state and municipal governments to popular assemblies dependent on the executive, creating a parallel structure that would drain the finances of town halls and sharply reduce their functions. Although details are not yet public, analysts consulted by Crisis Group affirmed that the government is likely taking a step toward replacing representative democracy with a model of governance based on direct public participation, thus eliminating universal suffrage and the secret ballot. Venezuelans narrowly rejected a similar constitutional reform proposal at the height of Chávez’s popularity in 2007, and Maduro may face pushback even from within his own ranks.” (ver Crisis Group, Venezuela: Last Rites for an Electoral Route out of Conflict? 06-02-2025, in https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/venezuela-last-rites-electoral-route-out-conflict).
As mentioned by Crisis Group, both Maria Corina Machado (MCM) and the regime claimed victory in the results of the May 25 regional elections. But the truth was that nobody won. Those of us who have said in countless opportunities that the electoral system of the regime is a swindle did not win, as was demonstrated on July 28, 2024, nor did the regime win, in spite of having painted the map of Venezuela in red, although the results they presented represent an electoral participation of 13, 59%, which gives room to say with propriety that those Governors, Mayors and Deputies of the National Assembly and Legislative Councils, do not represent anyone, that is, the majority of the remaining Venezuelan population, estimated in the difference of 86.41% (see in Spanish Meganalisisis, Final Bulletin, Participation of May 25, in https://x.com/Meganalisis/status/1926778960790122863).
In other words, even though the result points to the regime as a giant with feet of clay after May 25, the game is still zero sum. Neither the opposition has had enough strength to displace the regime, nor the regime has enough support to displace the opposition, as demonstrated by the figures of May 25, leaving for the time being the result in “tables”, but in a descending count for the opposition, if we add to this that much of the opposition strategy is based on the support that will finally come from the US.
Being as objective as possible, “US support” from MCM's point of view refers to the demonstrated support of US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio and the Latino fraction of the US State of Florida. However, the differences in foreign policy towards Venezuela between Ricard Grenell, very close to the US President, and Marco Rubio are public, notorious and communicated. Crisis Group points them out as follows:
“With both opposition hardliners and moderates seemingly bereft of a workable strategy, the route to political change in Venezuela would appear to have become more dependent on support from abroad. But there, too, the divisions are stark. “Maximum pressure”, as favoured by Machado and Rubio, amounts to a rerun of the policy that failed five years ago, although there is still ardent support for the strategy in some Republican quarters. Should the Grenell faction prevail in Washington, the result is likely to be a consolidation of the Maduro government, freed from foreign conditions relating to democracy and human rights. Grenell, who moved immediately after Trump’s inauguration in January to strike a deal with Maduro, indicated the following month that the U.S. president “does not want to make regime change”” (see Crisis Group, in the note above).
It could hardly be said that officials such as Rubio or Grenell are what could be called stable in an administration such as Donald Trump's, given the volatile situation in which that administration finds itself internally and externally, so placing “all the eggs” in that single basket does not look at all safe. If Grenell's position prevails and it turns out to be true that Trump “not want to make regime change” as he stated, that is, if the position of the oil companies that managed not to leave Venezuela completely, that of the Venezuelan bondholders, and the real possibility of a reactivation of the Venezuelan oil industry at the hands of the People's Republic of China prevail, a completely different opposition strategy against Maduro, away from the US and focused on the domestic front, will be necessary.
The constituent proposal is a realistic, constitutional and internally focused political solution, which should be studied in detail, not only by the opposition but also by Marco Rubio and Richard Grenell, as strange as it may seem; because even if they are at odds over the final exit from Venezuela, I do not believe that both of them wish, deep down, neither that the regime stays, nor that things end up in an exit that may harm Trump in these delicate moments of the US foreign policy.
But the most important aspect of the aforementioned analysis is that it concludes that the proposed constitutional reform “represents both a challenge and an opportunity” for the Venezuelan opposition, indicating in the end that “Through its brazen capture of the vote count in 2024, the Maduro government in effect closed off the electoral route to political change. Since then, the opposition has been trapped in a largely sterile debate over whether to continue to play for votes or to pin its hopes on foreign intervention or a military coup. When all strategic decisions are taken by politicians, elections assume an outsized importance. Not all politics is electoral, however, and the challenge facing Venezuelans today is to take the public clamour for a better life and forge a new vehicle for achieving it.” (see Crisis Group, in the note above).
But the real challenge presented by the Constitutional Reform is in fact the opportunity to put on the stage of national and international public opinion, the urgent need for the constitutional change required by the country and which is described in detail in ANCO's communiqué, which points out that leaving the 1999 Constitution intact is not the way to solve the structural political crisis we are suffering in Venezuela.
It was in the midst of this sterile debate pointed out by Crisis Group, that the regime took the opportunity to renew itself on May 25 and threaten us with a Constitutional Reform. Certainly, as they say, not all politics is electoral nor does it come from the parties; there are also proposals from the civil society. There is still until the end of the year to seize the opportunity to forge that new vehicle to address the popular clamor for a better life. And I could not imagine a better vehicle to be considered than a Constituent Assembly process...
Caracas, June 3, 2025
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