To negotiate or not to negotiate with criminals and terrorists? The controversy of this serious question arose again this past weekend when the government of the United States decided to negotiate with the criminal regime of Nicolás Maduro Moros, an exchange of prisoners, leaving aside the maxim that one does not negotiate with terrorists. The 2 narconephews Flores were exchanged for 7 Americans illegally detained in the dungeons of Maduro's security forces in Venezuela.
When the news came out, voices were immediately raised, nationally and internationally, to condemn this step by the U.S. government, taken without the knowledge of the caretaker government of Juan Guaidó, which definitively confirms that politically the interim is completely irrelevant for the Americans.
Despite how scandalous and disgusting this decision may be for us in Venezuela, I believe that instead of reacting immediately against the government of the only country that in one way or another has been in fact supportive of Venezuelans, even legislating in favor of the permanence of our refugees in their country, we should coldly analyze the position of that government in the face of what is happening right now in Venezuela.
This is not the first time that Americans have negotiated with terrorists. According to César Niño, PhD in Law, Associate Professor and Director of Research at the School of Politics and International Relations of the Sergio Arboleda University, Colombia, he says: "Against all odds, Donald Trump built a negotiation bridge with the Taliban in February 2020. The agreement was guided by incentives, the center of gravity of any negotiation. As agreed, the Taliban pledged not to allow Al Qaeda, ISIS or any other extremist group to operate within the areas they control. In return, NATO and Washington withdraw their presence from the area. This is a basic and mature equation of conflict in which the parties know that mutual stalemate is the unfeasibility of success for either side and the deterioration of their objectives” (see in Spanish César Niño, Negotiating with Organized Crime and Terrorism, in https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/opinion/latinoamerica21/negociar-con-el-crimen-organizado-y-el-terrorismo).
What do Venezuelans know, beyond the obvious, about this negotiation directly between the government of Joe Biden and the Maduro regime and its criminals? Absolutely nothing, apart from the bitterness of seeing that some criminals got away with it. From the point of view of the Americans, they exchanged garbage for valuable people, and possibly unlocked a negotiation in their future interest for Venezuelan oil. This is called "realpolitik"; and this is how it is handled by a government that does not only have Venezuela on its board of global interests. That's the way we have to see it, even if it upsets us. And that does not mean that I like what happened more than all those who are upset by this decision taken outside the supposed opposition representation.
The Biden administration weighed the consequences that this decision would have in relation to the hunting ground that would be opened against U.S. citizens around the world, to the point of pointing it out in the “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Return of Americans Wrongfully Detained in Venezuela”: “In addition, the State Department has introduced a new warning indicator “D” that is designed to help Americans understand where and when travel may incur increased risks of wrongful detention, potentially for long periods of time. If travelers make the decision to go despite this “D” warning, they need to know that they are incurring massive personal risk and that it may not be feasible for the U.S. Government to secure their release” (see Statement in, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/01/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-return-of-americans-wrongfully-detained-in-venezuela/).
But there is something else to consider. There are limits to this type of movement when a government negotiates with criminal groups: "... Negotiation with these actors can be highly costly if it does not achieve, in a short time, the dismantling of the organization and the reduction of its operations. The answer is that negotiation is a window of opportunity, since the irregular actors have built parallel orders and criminal governance in the territories where they operate" (emphasis added) (see Cesar Niño, in article cited above).
What does this mean? That the Americans are well aware of the possible consequences of not acting in a short time to dismantle these criminal structures. Do we Venezuelans know what the Americans will do after taking this step? Clearly not. This could be part of a larger strategy that we will only know in time. And if we do not participate, we will know when we can do nothing.
Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former chief of staff and chief negotiator in the Northern Ireland peace talks, in his book “Talking to Terrorists, How to End an Armed Conflict”, states the following: “If you offer the terrorists a political way out, then the military pressure can have the desired effect, especially if combined with a sustained effort to address the grievances that underlie the conflict. So the successful equation in dealing with serious terrorist groups is to combine military pressure down with the offer of a political way out through talks which can, over time, lead to an end to the armed conflict”… “If we conclude that the moral arguments against talking to terrorists do not outweigh the ethical imperative of saving lives, and if we think the utilitarian arguments against talking boil down to reasons to be careful about how you approach armed groups, rather than being arguments against doing so at all, then the question is whether there is any alternative to talking”. (1)
Powell termina concluyendo que “it is always right to talk to terrorists, even if it may not always be the right moment to embark on a negotiation. And if the armed group enjoys significant political support, it is very unlikely to be possible to end a conflict without a negotiation”… “So the question is not whether to talk to terrorists, but when and, particularly, how” (1) (emphasis added). And boy, do these terrorists have international political support. You can see that the "how" is absolutely crucial...
The situation confronting us here is to establish the correct route to deal with the criminals who hijack power in Venezuela and how to do it, especially if the way is to be peaceful. The Americans are trying out a path that is shocking us all -and it remains to be seen if it is successful or not- or if it is part of something much bigger. What is certain is that experts agree that any move must involve direct negotiations with them. And we do not necessarily like this first step, and even more so when we no longer have anyone credible to represent the legitimate interests of Venezuelans before the U.S. government, which is the one conducting these negotiations.
The right question to ask ourselves as the primary mourners of this tragedy is whether the step the Americans have taken is the right one. I believe that the first step in any hostage kidnapping situation is to give up something dear to the criminals in exchange for the lives of those most affected. In this case it was American prisoners because that was in the interests of the U.S. ¿And our interests? Thank you very much because WE WERE NOT THERE to fight for them. That is why we do not know if it corresponds to an articulated medium or long term strategy. So let us not be angry because they released the narconephews, let us be angry because we did not have a candle in that negotiation burial because of those who had the responsibility of being there with the US.
It is then up to us, Venezuelans, to seek to enter into these negotiations with legitimate actors, in order to free the political prisoners here, with a view to later negotiating the general liberation of the country, together with those who have the strength to do so. It sounds big but it is absolutely necessary. And that negotiation must be, in our opinion and although difficult, a Constituent Negotiation...
Caracas, October 4, 2022
Blog: https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
(1) Jonathan Powell, Talking to
Terrorists, How to End an Armed Conflict, Pág. 40-41, Epub ISBN:
9781448137527, published in Great Britain in 2014 by The Bodley Head 20
Vauxhall Bridge Road, London SW1V 2SA
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