Intervention at the Pío Tamayo Chair of the UCV on 11-21-2023, "El Esequibo: a fight won or lost?
As always, first of all, I would like to thank the Pío Tamayo Chair and Prof. Agustín Blanco Muñoz for the kind invitation to discuss important issues that concern Venezuelans. Never as now, Venezuela needs issues to be treated with the necessary depth and seriousness, especially in universities and research centers. This Chair of the UCV has been an example of such conduct for 40 years. I would like to congratulate Prof. Blanco Muñoz and all those who have made it possible.
The subject of the Chair that brings us together today is one of the few that unify all Venezuelans of all tendencies, which is why it must be treated with the utmost seriousness and rigor. The question of the Chair, "The Essequibo: a fight won or lost?", undoubtedly confronts us, in the political analysis, with a serious situation that may affect the future of the next generations of Venezuelans.
A word of caution before continuing. I do not intend in any way to present myself here as an expert on the subject of border delimitation, and especially the one that concerns us today, the dispute with the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. My interest, and the reason why I believe that my presence today could be justified to contribute something to a discussion on this matter, has to do with how this particular issue has been treated in the political arena since its inception, and that from a discussion that originated in the expansionist pretension of the British Empire of one of its colonies in America, ended up being the excuse of an authoritarian regime to remain in power.
How could that happen? My thesis is that the answer may lie in something that has not changed since we became a country: the way in which Venezuelan politicians have conducted the decisions related to what in Venezuela we call, since the beginning of time, "the sacred soil of the homeland", a concept that has nothing to do with realities but with a common feeling of Venezuelans, and that has been -and still is- persistently manipulated by the rulers since our foundation. And the case of the Essequibo does not escape this reality.
Let's take a brief trip to the past with Enrique Bernardo Núñez (1895-1964), journalist, narrator and essayist, who became the Official Chronicler of Caracas in 1945. Núñez was. And I quote, "one of the most important and least known Venezuelan writers of all times", end of quote, in commemoration of the 45th anniversary of his death in 2009 (see in Spanish Fuentes Documentales para el Estudio de la Vida y Obra de Enrique Bernardo Núñez, Serie Catálogos de Biblioteca Nacional, in https://tinyurl.com/yd8ytdxp).
Núñez recounted in detail for future generations, in an essay published in 1945, entitled "Three Moments in the Guayana Boundary Controversy – Cleveland and the Monroe Doctrine" (see in Spanish Enrique Bernardo Núñez, Tres Momentos en la controversia de límites de Guayana – Cleveland y la Doctrina de Monroe, Capítulo I, El Doctor Fortique y Lord Aberdeen - La Carta Shomburgk (1841-1845), Editorial Elite, Caracas, 1945, download at https://tinyurl.com/2ujbtsdt), the vicissitudes of Dr. Alejo Fortique, deputy to the Constituent Assembly of 1830, former minister of the Supreme Court of Justice and Minister Plenipotentiary of Venezuela before the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and Venezuelan of exception, who had the responsibility of representing Venezuela for the first time before Great Britain, in the demarcation of limits of its colony, the British Guiana.
In the first of these three moments, Núñez tells us, as only a city chronicler can describe it, the story of the first approach to the problem, which begins with the unilateral demarcation carried out by the British Crown Commissioner and surveyor, Robert Shomburgk, and I quote, "in charge of the survey of the English Colony of Guayana (who) has proceeded to plant posts and signs at the very mouths of the Orinoco..."... "The surprise is all the greater in Caracas as a few months before, upon learning of Shomburgk's appointment, the government of Venezuela had proposed through the Acting Consul of Great Britain, Daniel F. O'Leary, the conclusion of a treaty of limits by means of special Plenipotentiaries, and then both parties would appoint commissioners to fix by common agreement the limits of Venezuela and British Guiana" end of quotation (Núñez, P. 11).
From that very moment it could be considered that Great Britain, through its colony, did not act in good faith with its neighbor by ignoring the previously agreed joint appointment of commissioners for the establishment of boundaries.
When these facts became publicly known in Venezuela, and I quote, "the popular opinion...points to the abandonment of our borders and a festal destruction of our fortresses"... "Cagigal (referring to the expert of the time Juan Manuel Cagigal, who at that time was in France "in order to perfect his knowledge in the exact sciences") has been sent "to an honorable ostracism" instead of being commissioned to draw up the plan of Guayana as they have done in England with Shomburgk". The critic, and I quote, "recalls the lighthouse at Barima which has not been built for over three hundred years. "It is a pity, he concludes, the ignorance that certain men show in all that is outside Caracas", end of the quote, in a clear allusion to the demonstrated indifference of the rulers of the time before the step taken by Great Britain (Núñez, P. 12).
This meant that after having agreed with the British the conclusion of a boundary treaty, Venezuela was not adequately prepared to face the task and Great Britain took advantage of this.
Fortique, after a titanic diplomatic work, succeeded in getting the British colony, through its Minister of Colonies, to remove the demarcation posts of Shomburgk in 1842. And I quote, "On January 31 Lord Aberdeen (Foreign Minister of Great Britain) informs Fortique that in order to satisfy the wishes of the Government of Venezuela instructions will be sent to the Governor of British Guiana, Henry Leight, to remove the posts placed by Shomburgk in the Orinoco, but that does not mean, he declares, "that His Majesty's Government abandons any portion of the rights of Great Britain over the territory that was formerly possessed by the Dutch in Guiana" end of quote (Núñez, P. 15).
Proposal for Arbitration
On July 29, 1843, Alejo Fortique and Lord Aberdeen meet again. Núñez writes, and I quote, "In this interview Lord Aberdeen proposes to submit the matter to the decision of a third power as arbitrator of the dividing line" end of the quote (Núñez, P. 17).
Fortique, the man Venezuela has in charge in the field, and I quote, "decides that it is not convenient to accept the proposal to discuss on the basis of Shomburgk's letter, since it would be exposing himself to the risk of somehow justifying that demarcation" end of quote. However, the Venezuelan Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or what would now be called the then cabinet minister, Francisco Aranda, finds, on the contrary, the arbitration proposal convenient, authorizing Fortique to accept it in case an amicable settlement is impossible. And here it is demonstrated how little value politicians have consistently given to their diplomatic and technical representatives.
Núñez notes the following, and I quote, "Fortique is not in favor of arbitration. It is convenient to meditate if a foreign sovereign would agree to the Bocas del Orinoco, determined as England is to possess them, and if, once granted, he would not compensate them in the interior with a large part of what belongs to Venezuela" end of quote (Núñez, p.18). Note here the differences that Fortique has with his superior on this delicate issue. Years later, in 1899, it would be demonstrated with the Paris Arbitration Award that Fortique was right. In Venezuela, Fortique is already being blamed, and I quote, "for lack of diligence and for not having conducted the negotiations well", end of quote (Núñez, P. 19).
And what was the origin of such accusations? Fortique pays the price for the lack of results as a consequence of the little or no political disposition to allocate resources to solve a matter of national importance. Fortique was alone in London, and the little help for the required investigation, where a specialized team should have worked, was carried out in Madrid only by Rafael María Baralt, the distinguished writer and poet from Zulia. Baralt, and I quote, "has extracted the entire dossier relating to the boundaries of Guayana. He works in the Royal Library of Madrid and in the Archive of the Indies, in Seville... "Baralt explains that he works from twelve to five o'clock, the working hours of the archive, and from nine to twelve o'clock in the Institute of Hydrographic Charts. In addition he dedicates part of the night to write his reports for Fortique"... "On another occasion he informs that the extensive studies undertaken have deprived him of his health and he is ill"... "He expresses again and again his desire to return to Venezuela to join his family" end of the quote. But the Government, and I quote, "has decided to eliminate the position (of Baralt) in order to make the necessary economies and instructs Fortique to terminate his work" end of quote (Núñez, P. 19).
And I ask myself, how is a reductionist policy possible in a matter of such importance? It is really impressive to understand that we have reached this point only because of the efforts of illustrious Venezuelans who have given everything for Venezuela, and not because of a legitimate will of any government to resolve issues of the importance described. This story shows how things have been since our very foundation, without that having changed one iota since then.
Venezuela's proposal
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Viscount Canning, proposes to Fortique, and I quote, "to begin the negotiation by means of a note in which he exposes some of the reasons that support the right of Venezuela. His Majesty's Government could then reduce in the reply the sphere of its pretensions with some semblance of foundation" end of quote (Núñez, p. 18).
On January 31, 1844, Fortique presents his note to the Government of Great Britain, in the following terms, and I quote, "After a long account of the rights that Venezuela has as successor of Spain, he establishes as the basis of an arrangement to fix in the Essequibo, the dividing line between the two countries. "There is no doubt, he concludes, that the Essequibo is the river formed as if by nature; and since nothing or almost nothing is now occupied by the British colonists between it and the Orinoco, their plantations being on the other side, an arrangement on this basis would fulfill the object, and would secure to Great Britain even the most remote rights that might correspond to her as successor of Holland" end of quote (Nuñez, P. 20).
Great Britain's response
Lord Aberdeen's note dated March 30, 1844, concludes as follows, and I quote, "Persuaded, therefore, that the most important object for the interests of Venezuela is the exclusive possession of the Orinoco, His Majesty's Government are ready to cede to the Republic a part of the coast sufficient to secure to it the free dominion of the mouth of this its principal river, and to prevent its being under the command of a foreign power. With this view, and in the persuasion that it makes to Venezuela a concession of the greatest importance, His Majesty's Government is willing to dispense with its right to the Amacuro as the western boundary of British territory, and to consider the mouth of the river Guaima as the terminus of His Majesty's possession on the coast side. He will further consent to fix the boundary inland by drawing a line from the mouth of the Moroco to the point where the Barama River joins the Guaima: from there by the Barama upstream, to the Aunama, by which it will ascend to the place where this stream comes closer to the Acarabisi until its confluence with the Cuyuní, it will continue by this last river upstream until it reaches the highlands in the vicinity of Mount Roraima, where the waters that flow from the Esequibo are divided from those that run towards the Branco River" end of quote (Núñez, P. 22).
What was Fortique's reaction to this note? Lord Aberdeen upon meeting with him asks him and I quote, "What did you think of the note? Not as good as before I received it, Fortique replies. I had been told that the line would be the Moroco. If so, Aberdeen answers, make another proposal and the line will be fixed at the Moroco, but on condition that the territory between the Orinoco and the Moroco is not later ceded to any nation... " In the interview of April 16, Aberdeen is willing to agree to the terms previously proposed" end of the quote (Núñez, P. 22).
Indeed, Fortique makes the pertinent modifications in favor of the Venezuelan proposal because, and I quote, "the promise of not alienating the intermediate territory does not seem costly to him. The Bocas del Orinoco remain free. The English Government renounces the Amacuro, Barima and Guaima up to the Moroco" end of the quotation (Núñez, p.23).
Response of the Venezuelan government
Having already agreed with the government of Great Britain on a proposal in accordance with our claim, and I quote, "The note from Aberdeen and the correspondence from Fortique are passed on to the Governing Council. This body finds depressing for the national dignity the commitment not to alienate the territory to any foreign power" .... "Fortique adduces the reasons why he finds the said clause not at all humiliating..." and "He makes it clear that it is an amicable transaction. Not a discussion in law" end of quote (Núñez, P. 23) (emphasis added).
But the "national dignity" won, that political tare that has been with us since our foundation. From Madrid Fortique in 1845, and I quote "communicated to Soublette (Carlos Soublette, President of the Republic at that time) his fears "that we would lose rope and goat". There is no greater enemy of the good than the best, he adds, and by discarding it we stop doing things that we later feel we have lost" end of quote (Núñez, P. 24).
An incredible, titanic and impeccable work, carried out without resources and by the most brilliant of the Venezuelan civil service of the time, was lost by a cabinet of politicians ignorant of the subject, who clung to the only thing they did understand: national dignity. Had they trusted at least a little in the efforts of those who carried it out, this generation would not be dealing with this problem today.
Indeed, as Alejo Fortique said, we lost "rope and goat" in that first moment of this long history, and we were sorry we lost on that occasion, and not because we were not right. Will we lose again now? To the question of the Chair I answer that we will surely lose that fight if we insist on that paralyzing patriotism of 1845, without putting all the necessary human and technical resources in that task, added to the shameful guilty ignorance on the subject that our successive governments have had, and that lasts until today.
Thank you very much...
Caracas, November 21, 2023
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