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Venezuela, three courses of political action

By Luis Manuel Aguana

In chess mixed with the infinite pieces of puzzle that Venezuelan politics has become, which is now continental, we Venezuelans continue to try to draw simplistic cause-effect conclusions when reality points to an infinitely more complex and systemic relationship. I have always insisted that we are not going to find the answers in the 240-character twitter messages, nor in the interested positions of characters who have long demonstrated their incompetence in managing the crisis.

Each of us must use what God put in his head and draw his own conclusions with his own system of linking things together. That is why more than convincing anyone of a reality, the responsibility of those of us who are still writing should be centered on placing facts and situations on people so that they can make their own judgment. That of course does not exclude exposing our own about the problems. But we do not impose on anyone our judgment which is always and will always be perfectly debatable. And in that the networks are extraordinary because the messages can go both ways all the time.

Why do I say all this? Because anyone (and I stress anyone) can express in social networks their criteria, based or not. Anyone who has a smartphone with WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook or any social networking application can do it, not just me. My position has always been that opinions (everyone has one, like navels) should be serious and grounded, but not everyone does, so we've made the Venezuelan situation really unmanageable. What can we do?

I believe that the first thing, methodologically speaking, is to separate the problems and consider them in an isolated way in order to study them. That's what you do when you're trying to solve something complex: model the problem, even if some details escape along the way, even if they're important. Let's see in the country three situations modeled in three blocks with different approaches.

The political situation has brought us -whether we want it or not- to almost end the year with the regime in office. Guaidó and his G4/MUD-FA combo have failed and his attempts to revive the legendary and glorious moments of the super marches to wreck the regime as well. That's a fact after 16N. The regime is still alive and kicking. Seen this way, they have succeeded in sustaining themselves and we have failed to get them out.

The International Community still supports the official opposition and that is why they still survive the regime in a sort of "parallel government" waiting for a denouement, with no probable date of resolution. And in that limbo the government advances, and advances very well. They now have their "Mesita" with Timoteo Zambrano at the head, with serious intentions of taking over the Directive of the National Assembly for the next legislature on January 5, 2020 with a clean green suitcase, and continue their firm path to next year's parliamentary elections. They haven't stopped there and the MUD-FA is shedding the daisy of whether or not to participate in those parliamentary elections that the regime has as its objective - including negotiated Rectors - even if they have said otherwise. Remember Guaidó saying that they would not participate: "We are not going to participate in any space that does not provide a real solution to the conflict in Venezuela," said interim President Juan Guaidó when asked about his participation in the 2020 parliamentary elections, with a renewal of the Electoral Power”. (see in Spanish Efecto Cocuyo in https://efectococuyo.com/politica/presidenciales-o-parlamentarias-tres-claves-de-las-declaraciones-de-guaido/).

But the actions of the National Assembly say otherwise. They set up the racket for the selection of the Rectors of the CNE with the deputies of the PSUV who left their posts and are therefore illegitimate. So is the regime's negotiated collusion with its opposition in the National Assembly, but with a strong opposition stance of the 16J Fraction, the only one that has so far had a position in defense of the interests of Venezuelans.

That said, everything indicates that in the near future we have an official opposition that goes directly to an election with the regime (parliamentary, presidential or both) with a CNE of common agreement. That is, the official materialization of the coexistence with the regime of Nicolás Maduro Moros.

On the other hand, we have another political opposition that excludes the possibility of coexistence. María Corina Machado, Diego Arria and Antonio Ledezma, the three together or separately, have insisted on an exit from the regime of power before any election, arguing that it is necessary for the President in charge to be freed from his partisan ties and to designate a Government of National Unity with all the factors of the country in order to be able to fight adequately to achieve the expulsion of Maduro and his regime from power.

There are two political models with very different courses of action. However, there is a third one, certainly not very visible until now, where there is a civil society proposal for a Popular Plebiscite Consultation of the Venezuelan people for the Cessation of Usurpation, in the terms and conditions that we have already described in this blog. However, the difference between this one and the two previous ones is that civil society does not seek any political position. In fact, the idea is that the consultative process should lead to handing over political power to those who should hold it naturally and legitimately, that is, to the Government in Charge of Juan Guaidó. This has been little understood, by Guaidó himself and his followers, confusing us with his enemies.

In the three modeled blocks there are three clearly differentiated courses of political action. The official opposition advocates elections WITH Mature in Power, while the other opposition, let's call it radical (Machado, Arria, Ledezma), proposes a struggle to get out of the regime, having Guaido, for now, as President in Charge (an issue that could change at any time). And finally we, the citizens from civil society, advocating that all this be decided by the Venezuelan people.

In my opinion, after the facts have been described, a new election is not acceptable when the criminals who control it are in power, with which I join the struggle until I leave the regime and then go to free elections after fumigating the CNE. Will this be possible if Juan Guaidó does not separate himself from the MUD-FA and exercises constitutionally all his powers as President in Charge, to fight and leave the regime? If Juan Guaidó does not separate from the MUD-FA and they insist on a negotiated solution behind the backs of the Venezuelans, the country will be an unstable pressure cooker because even the chavo-madurists themselves know that this regime is unfeasible and we will never have a peaceful solution of citizen coexistence in Venezuela with criminals controlling power.

I consider it very unlikely that the party leaders will untie Juan Guaidó in order to exercise a Presidency freed from partisan ties in order to achieve a definitive solution to the problem of Venezuela, when it was precisely they who fabricated the Statute of Transition to create a parliamentary government that does not exist in our Constitution. I also consider that it is also unlikely that they will accept our consultative proposal for the Cessation of Usurpation, if it is not imposed on them as a solution from the outside, because they have not yet understood it (or if they have done so but fear losing control since the citizens are the protagonists of it).

This would take us to the following scenarios as possible exits: a) That Juan Guaidó rises with his Presidency in Charge, because in the end he is the only one responsible as designated by the Constitution (Art. 233), and carry out the broad-based Transitional Government requested by the Venezuelans; and within the framework of that government, call the people to a Constituent process that will bring about the crisis, as did the Chileans on November 15; or b) do not do so and events will take it forward, with the citizens, sooner rather than later, having to summon the people to be consulted to resolve the country's crisis after a wave of death and destruction. In that case the consultation of the people should include the succession of power since neither Juan Guaidó nor the MUD-FA decided to assume it.

I have dared to simplify the complex Venezuelan political reality into three basic models, but we can greatly multiply that complexity by including what happens outside our borders. For example, if the MUD-FA and the regime succeed with their cohabitation negotiations (first course of action), Venezuela will continue to be used as a base for the destabilization of the continent, elevating our qualification as a potentially dangerous country for the internal security of the United States. The rest is left to your imagination...

Caracas, November 23, 2019

Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana

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