By Luis Manuel Aguana
I begin by quoting Luis Almagro, Secretary General of the OAS and main
architect of our current solid international position against the dictatorship:
"Maduro's departure is the main
humanitarian aid we can give to Venezuela" (see Almagro's message in
Spanish in https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/almagro-la-salida-maduro-es-la-principal-ayuda-humanitaria-que-podemos-dar-venezuela-n4172048). Without
undermining the opposition's efforts to lead the regime into a political
situation of demonstrating that they refuse to help the Venezuelan people by
preventing at all costs the entry of food and medicine that our country so
desperately needs, we all know that anything that can enter would not be enough
to alleviate, at least to a reasonable degree, the hunger and diseases that
these criminals have generated in 20 years of misgovernment and tyranny.
In other words Almagro put the things in the corresponding place: It is
not humanitarian aid. Maduro has to leave so that Venezuela can continue. But
what is missing for that to happen? Even the unthinkable has already happened,
like that historic speech by the President of the United States, Donald Trump
in Miami, backing Juan Guaidó as President in Charge of Venezuela, recognizing
the struggle of this indomitable people and an ultimatum to the usurper and the
military accompanying him. That had never happened before with a U.S. President
with any other country. This should have been more than enough for Maduro to
pick up his macundales and flee the country. But that did not happen.
And that brings me back to the Venezuelan military. There is no way that
there will be a new government in Venezuela without resolving the military
issue. And the military still insists on supporting the regime. Why? In fact
this is a regime where the entire public sector is controlled by the military
where civilian expression is minimal. The only thing the tyranny lacks is for
Maduro to be military. If there is an armed intervention by an outside force to
bring order to this madness that is happening in Venezuela, the final control
of the country's security must then be handed over to a Venezuelan Armed Force.
And if this does not exist as we knew it, then it will have to be done again.
And we have to address that military issue whether we want it or not
from a civilian perspective. Hugo Chávez dedicated himself to destroying the
military institution after April 11, 2002, in order to prevent the same thing
from happening to him that day when he was deposed from the Military High
Command. Personally, I don't think the military has gone mad to permanently
support this Castro puppet, as Trump called the usurper Maduro, accepting right
away that all those above that institution are corrupt and that's why they
"don't give up" Maduro, ending the nightmare once and for all. There has to be
something else.
The threats hanging over the officials who still maintain the regime are
in some cases giving results and the offers of future amnesty made by the
President in charge have produced important defections but have not been
decisive for the fall of the regime. What happens there? What needs to be done
additionally so that the effect accelerates?
Little by little, there is a general perception, including the armed
institution itself, that the regime is unfeasible. It is surrounded on all
sides internationally and it is very possible that some of these high officials
are negotiating their situation in the face of a new situation in the country. But even so, it
has not just fallen.
Looking for
reasons, I came across a recent note published in the Washington Post signed by
General (R)(Ej) Antonio Rivero (see "Exiled general: Why the Venezuelan
military hasn't turned against Maduro" https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2019/02/07/venezuela-military/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9267077887bc) where Rivero gives three reasons:
1) "...within the military high
command, there is a deeply impregnated filial commitment to the late President
Hugo Chávez and his ideology"; 2) "...the
armed forces receive privileges at the highest levels, such as promotions,
bonuses and bribes"; and 3) "...many
of the military are involved in illicit activities such as drug
trafficking".
Reasons 2 and 3 are historical in
Venezuela. The military has always received these benefits from all governments
and there have always been criminals at these levels. So with the fact of going
too far I don't see why they would stop, pragmatically speaking. But the first
thing is decisive. A commitment to chavismo? That is difficult. Any new
government could not begin in a new military state of affairs with an Armed
Force whose principal officers are inoculated precisely by the virus that
killed their institution in practice. And that is fundamental.
I remember that in life the disappeared General of Division (Ej) Jacobo
Yépez Daza (see in Spanish Jacobo Yépez Daza, Requiem by a civilist General, in
http://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/2015/12/jacobo-yepez-daza-requiem-por-un.html) indicated to me
that one of the greatest errors committed with the Armed Force was having
reinstated in the institution those responsible for the coup of 4F-1992, for
the sake of a supposed institutional reunification, and what was achieved was
quite the opposite when the internal scales of merit and seniority were broken,
breaking with "the three fundamental
pillars on which the organization, administration, operation and command unit
of the Armed Force rest, such as DISCIPLINE, OBEDIENCE AND SUBORDINATION",
Yepez dixit
If this is the case, Juan Guaidó will never be able to change the minds
of those officers so that they change sides, without taking into account all
the ideological work that in these last 17 years, after 2002, those officers
have received, with courses and permanent official missions to Cuba and other
communist countries. So the pod is not a simple "pass to democracy"
that the National Assembly and the Law of the Statute for the Transition to the
military are doing. The thing is more complex. If we stay with that superficial
analysis, we could have Maduro for a while unless the communism in those
soldiers who command the Armed Force by force is defeated. And I think Trump
has it very clear and he's moving in that direction. Which takes me to the next
level of action.
If what we have then is a highly ideologized Armed Force that does not
listen to the reasons of hunger, death and misery of its people, then it is
time to think about rebuilding that institution with whatever is salvageable
from it. And that can only be done by former officers who are available and who
have demonstrated institutional knowledge and devotion for the recovery of the
armed institution.
So the first thing that politicians should be
thinking, starting with President Juan Guaidó, who are managing this transition
ship, is to start at the top - as the military effectively thinks - by
designating a Military High Command immediately - including the Minister of
Defense - that will be in charge of that institutional restructuring and that
the recoverable officers can look at and respect in a clearly established
direct line of command with "discipline, obedience and
subordination", so that they see and touch a new situation of the Armed
Force and the country. These officers would abandon the communist structures of
the regime, weakening them to fertilize a new organization that must begin to
be built before the departure of Maduro de Miraflores. That is if it could
effectively accelerate the end of usurpation. Start now
because tomorrow is too late...
Caracas, February 22, 2019
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
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