By Luis Manuel Aguana
Before delving into the core point I wish to highlight in this article regarding the controversial oil agreement “with the US” (I place this term in quotation marks and will explain why below)—which has caused a stir both domestically and internationally—I first want to organize my thoughts so I can properly analyze the situation.
According to the Fact Sheet released by the White House on August 31, the US government signed an agreement with a private company that had secured an oil concession from the Delcy Rodríguez regime (see Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery, The White House, August 31, 2026, in https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-historic-oil-agreement-to-secure-american-energy-dominance-and-drive-venezuelas-economic-recovery/).
According to information circulating on social media, this company—North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP)—is owned by the controversial businessman Alejandro Betancourt, who is wanted in several European countries for money laundering. But that is another story…
The White House fact sheet outlines only the terms of the U.S. agreement with NABEP, without mentioning—as they were under no obligation to do so—the arrangements agreed upon between NABEP and the Venezuelan state. That is to say, the terms of the concessions cooked up by the "Rodrigato" administration with an internationally wanted criminal; however, the published fact sheet allows one to infer that NABEP secured—from the Delcy Rodríguez regime and within the framework of the new reform to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law (published in the *Official Gazette of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*, Extraordinary Issue No. 6.978, dated January 29, 2026)—"100-year concessions for 17 oil fields with proven reserves of approximately 65 billion barrels".
The first point to highlight here is that the famous “agreement” is not signed between the regime and the US, but rather between the US and a shell company founded by Mr. Betancourt—which obtained oil concessions from the Venezuelan regime—hence my use of quotation marks around the term “agreement with the US.” The terms of that agreement between the US and NABEP could say absolutely anything—or nothing of consequence—and, in principle, would not affect us. What *is* important for Venezuela’s near future is the validity of what an illegitimate regime actually managed to sign with an international criminal.
The institutional destruction of the country wrought by the criminals who have misgoverned Venezuela has caused such a regression that the Rodríguez regime modified the Hydrocarbons Law to break the Venezuelan State’s monopoly on hydrocarbon exploitation, going so far as to allow direct concessions to private companies.
That is not bad in itself, because, in practice, we have returned to the concession model used by dictator Juan Vicente Gómez in the early 20th century. He would grant contracts to his inner circle—who would then transfer them to international companies and corporations like Standard Oil of New Jersey—allocating the best tracts of national territory to his associates so they could get rich overnight alongside the ruler.
I am not saying it was unnecessary to break the Venezuelan State’s oil monopoly; rather, the issue lies in the manner in which the first step was taken. Given the track record of the criminals still governing Venezuela, it could not have happened any other way: a shady oil deal involving known frontmen.
They had absolutely no intention of proceeding via an international public tender—which would have been the proper way to handle the prime assets awarded to NABEP in a concession covering “17 oil fields with proven reserves of approximately 65 billion barrels for a period of 100 years”.
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and all the major players in the global oil sector could easily have participated there. Any debt the Venezuelan state might have owed them could have been resolved amicably between the parties during negotiations.
But many of you might ask: how could they participate in such a tender when Venezuela still lacks the rule of law and has a completely illegitimate government unable to guarantee the kind of investments required to revive Venezuelan oil production? The answer is precisely: IT CANNOT BE DONE. This brings us to the impasse inherent in the Trump-Rubio plan. Venezuela’s economy cannot be revived without a political transition leading to a legitimate government. Period.
The agreement between NABEP and the US—which follows the NABEP-Rodrigato concession—is UNSUSTAINABLE because the former depends on the latter, and the latter (the concession) is revocable once a legitimate government takes power in Venezuela, even if exit costs have to be negotiated.
The only way President Trump could claim at a press conference—as he already has—that he controls Venezuelan oil is by INVADING THE COUNTRY. Otherwise, all he has is leverage over the "extractors" to pull off the kind of botched job they ended up doing with Alejandro Betancourt. Remember, the Trump administration has never admitted to a US invasion of Venezuela on January 3rd; instead, they described it as a police operation with military support.
Only a military invasion would allow Trump to make such claims and guarantee—through force of arms—that the largest, most established oil companies would invest the required $100 billion in our oil industry, backed by proper guarantees and protection. Otherwise, they will have to ask Betancourt and Delcy for the money... Good luck with that!
Many Venezuelans remain outraged that the US is “stealing our oil” through that “agreement.” Calm down; they cannot do it—not even with that shoddy concession granted to NABEP. Unless they have the cash to scale up operations to the levels the US expects as outlined in that Fact Sheet—and they don’t... This brings me to the real point of this note: what comes next.
No US administration—present or future—can expect a serious government, one born of the popular will in Venezuela, to ratify the concession granted to Betancourt’s shell company. The very least such a government would do is expropriate it on grounds of public interest and—should it decide to keep the concession at all—renegotiate the terms established with the US, particularly regarding scope and duration.
No one questions Venezuela’s historic interest in maintaining trade relations with the US, especially in the oil sector. What cannot exist, however, is a relationship where Venezuelan interests are subordinated to those of the US through an agreement that undermines the country’s sovereignty.
If President Trump was seeking a short-term media splash regarding a supposed increase in the US “Strategic Petroleum Reserve” for electoral gain, events have shown he achieved the exact opposite. There is no such “increase,” since, in practice, the agreement will not get off the ground without the necessary funding—and certainly not with the midterm elections just over a month away.
I believe President Trump would gain far more support among his Latino electorate in the US if he finally “extracted” what remains of the Maduro regime by promoting a Transitional Governing Junta until free, fair, and verifiable elections can be held in Venezuela. Hopefully, Secretary of State Marco Rubio—who has long understood the Venezuelan political situation vis-à-vis the US more clearly than anyone—can prompt a rethink and help correct this error made by the Trump administration regarding Venezuela, for the future benefit of both nations.
Caracas, September 7, 2026
Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
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