By Luis Manuel Aguana
A great deal has happened in the six months since Nicolás Maduro Moros was removed from power. In light of the events of recent months, I confess that I misjudged the reality of the situation; it was necessary for the waters to settle a bit before the bottom could be seen clearly. I wish to begin by explaining that the term "tutelage"—as we have been using it—is not the most accurate description of the current situation in Venezuela; we have been using it incorrectly. Let us see why.
Since January 3—the date Nicolás Maduro Moros and Cilia Flores were removed by U.S. military force—we Venezuelans have believed that the U.S. had "militarily intervened" in our territory. We believed that Venezuela had become a country occupied by a foreign force, that the regime installed by the invading force had automatically become a U.S. puppet, and that the U.S. had consequently become its guardian. Yet, while that may have been the case in practice, it is not actually what happened.
Certainly, the Venezuelan military laid down its arms before an unstoppable force—a force whose clear and open threat continued to loom over the heads of those who succeeded Maduro in power. On the very day of "Operation Absolute Resolution," the U.S. President himself declared to the media that his administration would "run the country".
However, those words stuck in everyone's minds, creating the impression that the U.S. had actually invaded us. In reality, according to the explanations provided to the U.S. Congress, what took place was technically a "law enforcement operation backed by military forces" (specifically, a law enforcement/military extraction operation). It was carried out as part of "Operation Southern Spear" and the counter-narcotics efforts of Southern Command and the Department of Justice.
If a military operation like the one carried out in Iraq in 2003 had actually been executed—with the requisite authorization from the U.S. Congress (that is, if an AUMF similar to the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq had existed for Venezuela)—then the narrative of "We’re going to run the country" would be legally valid in the U.S.
What is my point? That the only way the U.S. can force Venezuelan authorities to carry out orders from the White House is through coercion. According to the DRAE dictionary: "Coercion: 1. f. Force or violence used against someone to compel them to say or do something." In other words, there is no tutelage in Venezuela; what exists is coercion.
I can only imagine the sheer weight of the dossiers—now matters of public, notorious, and widely reported record—on each member of Venezuela’s "trilogy of power." These files explain why they are desperate to avoid suffering the same fate as Maduro, and why Delcy Rodríguez and the criminals in her cabinet remain in power.
This is also why any alternative to the current executive branch in Venezuela—such as the Transitional Governing Junta that many of us have publicly called for—makes absolutely no sense to the U.S. Such a body would not be in a position to receive the same orders, nor would it be subject to the same coercion. The explanation is simple and is summarized in the following paragraph:
"The removal of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, in and of itself, does not automatically imply that the United States can legally act in Venezuela as if it had carried out a military invasion and occupation. If the Administration justified the operation as a limited law enforcement mission, that characterization restricts the powers that can be derived from it. To justify actions equivalent to those of an occupying power, it would be necessary to rely on additional facts and legal grounds, the sufficiency of which would remain a subject of debate under both U.S. constitutional law and international law" (see in Spanish conversation with ChatGPT, in https://chatgpt.com/share/6a7524a6-cf10-83ea-8f3b-7928c368b16b).
In other words, the Trump administration cannot legally justify its actions in the U.S. as if it had militarily invaded the country, but it *can* coerce current Venezuelan leaders by threatening to subject them to the same measures applied to Maduro—backed by the same legal reasoning. Yet, if they comply, the coercion ends. That poses a huge problem for us.
But that is also the source of the "force" keeping the dogs of political repression within the country somewhat leashed, and forcing the remnants of the Maduro regime to sit at the same table as an opposition that represents no one—because they, too, are just as coerced as the regime. After pocketing USAID funds, you tell me whether the "opposition" from the PJ-VP duo shouldn't also be held accountable to the Trump administration for that.
It is paradoxical that the corruption and crimes committed by both sides serve as the glue binding them together to "resolve" Venezuela's political crisis at a negotiating table that is, in reality, nothing of the sort. It is a table for carrying out orders under duress.
Is that the only way to solve Venezuela's problem? Forcing together the criminals responsible—and complicit—in the disaster and dictating what they must do? While it might seem valid, that cannot be a good way to launch a new era of democracy and freedom. Yet, for the reasons previously stated, the U.S. could not choose a different political path—unless it decided to formally and openly intervene militarily, seeking legal authorization for such action back home.
However, coercion has also served another purpose: changing laws to favor U.S. interests in Venezuela, particularly regarding oil. That course of action was to be expected, even though it reignited the anti-American sentiment that always lurks beneath the surface in a historically left-leaning Latin America. It remains paradoxical, however, that this decision indirectly benefited the country by putting an end to the crude oil handouts the regime had previously granted to the Cubans and the Chinese. At the very least, the US is paying the oil bills—even while managing the funds resulting from that very coercion of the regime—without us Venezuelans having any say in the matter. At some point, they will be forced to answer for this.
I would also like to point out that the Americans are not here for oil and other resources for any reasons other than those that brought the Cubans, Chinese, Russians, and Iranians here. Clearly, they want U.S. companies to have an advantage over others regarding our oil resources. And if the agreements reached with them—in accordance with the law—are acceptable to both parties, and if they PAY for the crude oil and the taxes, then what is the problem? I believe this is a discussion often driven by self-serving ideological biases; it requires a negotiation framework accepted by both countries, once the legitimacy of all Venezuelan public institutions has been restored.
Given this reality—where coercion is the true force driving events in the country since January 3rd—we can hardly demand anything from the US other than that it finally bring the remnants of the Maduro regime and the opposition that shielded it for 27 years to face American justice. Furthermore, its presence in the country should be limited to protecting—by agreement and upon request—whichever Venezuelan government is left in place pending free, fair, and verifiable elections. The 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to do this (Article 187.11 of the CRBV: Authorizing the deployment of Venezuelan military missions abroad or foreign missions within the country). In fact, perhaps this is precisely what is planned for those currently being coerced at a compliance negotiating table, and I have simply jumped the gun...
Caracas, August 7, 2026
Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario