By Luis Manuel Aguana
In the current state of the
political situation in the country, it is difficult to make forecasts. The
Venezuelans stopped waiting for something that did not stop happening as the
regime successfully moved forward in destroying the little that remained.
People are fleeing Venezuela. Those people who pass by thousands across the
border into Colombia and Brazil are not the "rich" fleeing communism,
they are paradoxically the poor whose lives became unviable in today's
Venezuela. Either they go or they don't eat, it's as simple as that. That is our reality to this day.
While Maduro and his regime are
destroying the economy and our Republican way of life, the remaining
Venezuelans are still debating how to deal with this problem. How do we stop
the bleeding from the wound that has been done to our country and not die in
the attempt. We could say without fear of being mistaken that Venezuela has
divided into two groups: those who believe that the solution will come from
within the country, and those who believe that within Venezuela there is
nothing more to do because the institutional framework is destroyed, and that
international aid is needed to solve the problem.
Both Venezuelas are at odds. The
first group, let's call it the local solution group, has a polychromy that goes
from looking for an electoral way to coexist with the regime "until this
is resolved", of course without giving a clear time horizon beyond
indicating that they "won" the next electoral process, to the most
belligerent groups that reject the electoral solutions but without saying clearly
what the way of struggle is beyond demanding that the regime
"resigns" from its functions, appealing to social pressure, prelude
to another bloodbath in the streets.
The second group, let's call it the
international solution group, is based on the assumption that in Venezuela it
will hardly get its head up due to the situation of institutional kidnapping of
all the public authorities, including the National Assembly, which makes it
more difficult every day to dislodge a regime that has stuck itself like poison
ivy to the trunk of the country, to the point that it is killing it. The
solution in this case is for the international community to come to our aid to
cut the ivy and clean the dying tree.
Both groups are incompatible, to the
point that the former sabotages the latter. The local solution group thinks
that an intervention that they do not control - and could not control even if
they wanted to - would not be welcome, and consequently they lobby
internationally and move politically to ruin the efforts being made to achieve
any solution that ends in a humanitarian intervention in Venezuela, even if the
regime puts us in prison and we are dying of hunger and disease.
Meanwhile, the international
solution group says that without the support of the country's political,
economic, social, and ecclesiastical sectors, it would be difficult to convince
an international force - and particularly the United States - to support the
rescue of democracy and freedom in Venezuela, since the international community
would not see us united for the same purpose. They insist that the main sectors
that make life in Venezuela possible must be convinced so that this
humanitarian intervention can be made possible.
Result: Neither of us has the
solution to the problem, but both of us have the solution to the problem. It
looks contradictory but it's not. The truth is that the international
community, and in particular the United States government, has grown tired of
welcoming the many representatives of the Venezuelan opposition, each with a
different idea of how to solve the problem caused by the regime. And that makes
sense. I can imagine hearing them say: When they agree on what they want to do
and how they want to do it, let them come up with a plan and then we help
them'. And that will never happen in the present conditions with two opposing
Venezuelan groups with two different visions of the problem. And in the
meantime the regime raging with us in the country.
Could both positions be reconciled?
I don't know. Remember that the interests of the political groups in Venezuela
are above the interests of the country. Is that hard? Otherwise, the matter
would have been resolved a long time ago. And how? An unrestricted support from
the National Assembly for its own exiled magistrates and the High Court they
constituted would provide the political solution par excellence to achieve a
National Emergency Governing Council that would lead and coordinate actions
from abroad to force a peaceful solution to the problem in Venezuela with the
help of a multinational force.
This is how the international
community would see us together and coordinated to tackle a problem that they
are as or more interested in solving than we are as well. It is not an issue
that groups outside or inside are right. The point is that the interests of all
must be put aside in favour of the country. It seems like a common place to
repeat it but you have to do it thousands of times to see if you understand it.
You don't need to agree on everything, you just need to be willing to walk a
long way together to get out of the problem.
But we are also Venezuelans: "Compared to a group of 45 countries
from all over the world, Venezuela proved to have one of the highest rates in
need of power. Similar cultural traits have appeared repeatedly in other
studies on the cultural identity of Venezuelans" (1) According to
this, no one in Venezuela will cede power even if it means the suffering of
people. No political sector will yield to a government in which it does not
participate or in which it does not have any influence, so a more drastic
solution is needed than the interests of third parties in this equation.
In an
exercise in political fiction, former Ambassador Diego Arria, former President
of the UN Security Council, circulated a press release on social networking
sites indicating what might happen after a very possible UN Security Council
decision, which we reproduce in full in this blog (see in Spanish Gobierno de
Emergencia Nacional de Venezuela, at http://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/2018/07/gobierno-de-emergencia-nacional-de.html).
He used to make it one of many notes published when the Security Council
authorized a multinational force to restore democracy in Haiti in 1994, only
changing the country's name to Venezuela.
According
to that note, based entirely on UN Security Council Resolution 940 of 1994,
"Approval of the establishment of a UNIH advance group to restore
democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President
and the authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to extend the mandate of
UNMIH" (see UN Security Council Resolution 940 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/940(1994)
) There is no impediment for the UN Security Council not to do the same
for Venezuela, except that there is a legitimate Venezuelan government
to whom to hand over power.
Read this
last point carefully: Venezuela's political solution lies in the fact that we must
first agree on the appointment of a legitimate government to lead joint
coordination with this multinational force. Whether this government leaves the
National Assembly or the legitimate Supreme Court of Justice in exile is not
the problem of the international community, but it is our problem. And it is
absolutely necessary to evict those who illegitimately exercise power in
Venezuela, as happened in Haiti in 1994.
We have
already introduced the request to the legitimate TSJ in exile for the
appointment of a National Emergency Governing Council (see complete request in Spanish
at https://tinyurl.com/y7x87ldb), and there is also a ruling by the
High Court that urges the need for the National Assembly to fill the power
vacuum under the Constitution (see the ruling of the Supreme Court in Spanish at
https://twitter.com/TSJ_Legitimo/status/1014611587745886211). What are the two Powers waiting
for, jointly or separately?
Caracas,
July 21, 2018
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
(1)
Managing Culture for
Success, Challenges and opportunities in Venezuela, Granell, Graraway, Malpica,
Ediciones IESA 1997, Pág. 21, ISBN 980-217-189-1
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