Between the institutional and the political


By Luis Manuel Aguana

Many years ago I made a simple comparison to make clear the difference between the institutional and the political: "What should be the way out of this country in the face of this shameful anomie of these pseudo-opposition leaders? Should we wait for this leadership to "mature" so that it can begin to really - and structurally - solve the problems of the people? Or should we all just sit back and stare at our navels? It is as if a car was left in an accident on a dark road due to a mechanical failure (the institutional) and the solution suggested to the passengers to continue is to change the driver (the political). Obviously another driver will not move the car..." (see in Spanish Doce Ejes y un Destino, in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/2013/06/doce-ejes-y-un-destino.html).

Well, the confrontation of the political parties in Venezuela in the 40 years prior to 1998, and more than 20 years since this "socialist" tragedy - more than 60 years! - has been fundamentally about having the opportunity to drive the car or bus I mentioned, and of course who should be the driver. NOBODY ever considered that the bus - the institutional - was in ruins and in terrible condition to continue, much less to undergo urgent repairs (although there were voices that shouted it out without being heard). Unfortunately, in 1998, Venezuelans tried to change the driver - the political - believing the story of a swindling road "mechanic" who poisoned the bus and melted it down a few kilometers later. Now we are in a worse condition than before, with an irreparable bus and the Venezuelans still being deceived with the illusion of restarting the bus if we change the driver.

The bus represents the institutions of the Venezuelan state. According to the classic model of Institutions, Sectors and Systems, "Government action is not an administrative function, but is intrinsically political, in the most vulgar sense of the art of the possible and in the most technical sense of authoritarian assignment of priorities, according to the ruler's capture of the demands of the governed group. Institutions are administered and sectors are governed..." (1).

What does this mean? I already mentioned it in 2012: There is a well-defined boundary between administration and government. In other words, that the institutions are responsible for a healthy administration of resources, constituting the primary cells and therefore the backbone of the administration of the State. They are the ones that carry out the action of the government, that is, they are the ones that MAKE THINGS HAPPEN. The work of politicians is the assignment of priorities within the framework of an existing institutionality. But with an institutionality eaten away and destroyed by corruption and dominated by political rather than technical criteria, it is impossible, read well, impossible, to provide quality services or goods in the long term (see in Spanish La Institucionalidad: ¿Cómo se come eso?, in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/2012/01/la-institucionalidad-como-se-come-eso.html).

It is clear that at this time, since there are no institutions (because they were completely destroyed by the plague that fell on us since 1998), the solutions that must be proposed first must be of an INSTITUTIONAL nature to return the State to a minimum of governability. What is the role of the political in these circumstances? Determining priorities according to an established institutional model, and in the absence of such a model, Venezuelan politics has been reduced to the basic terrain of "take off and put on", as it were. And the solutions that come out of the politicians address the problem of power substitution from that terrain, given the institutional destruction of the State. Hence, the political solutions they present try to impose factual courses of action without any institutional basis. That approach is neither good nor bad, it is simply different, and not necessarily contradictory, and in our view presents an international rejection that makes it difficult and lengthy to solve the serious problem of the Venezuelan people.

From ANCO we have supported a solution proposed by a group of honorable citizens of the Venezuelan civil society for the rescue of the State within the mechanisms established in the Charter of the OAS from the INSTITUTIONAL perspective (see in Spanish Respaldo de la solicitud de la Sociedad Civil venezolana a la OEA por una Solución Humanitaria Electoral, in http://ancoficial.blogspot.com/2020/06/comunicado-anco-respaldo-la-solicitud.html) through humanitarian aid that is imposed by peaceful, constitutional and electoral means, and which restores a minimum of institutionality to the country so that it can then take off in the political sphere, through a Transitional Government or a Presidential election. 

I am not going to point out here again the degree of destruction of the Venezuelan electoral institution better known as the CNE. I will simply say that it is not possible to use it to resolve the crisis, as it is already known to everyone, and that is why we ask that the replacement of its functions be imposed through the member states of the OAS, and that they function in an ad-hoc manner as arbitrators to carry out what cannot be guaranteed in Venezuela: a clean, authentic and transparent electoral process, either to consult the people about the path to follow through a transition or simply the immediate election of the political leadership that would begin to rebuild the entire destroyed institution.

I'm not going to explain again how that's achieved by a criminal regime that would refuse to allow it (I already explained it in my previous note, Humanitarian Electoral Solution, in  https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/p/blog-page_902.html), But I will point out that this path is by no means exclusive to any formula that the opposition political leadership may wish to apply, because both - the institutional and the political - would be aimed at exactly the same objective: to change the political situation that plagues Venezuelans.

However, the fact that some Venezuelans do not believe that NOBODY outside Venezuela will move a single finger to help us militarily if they do not see that we do so first, does not mean that the rest of us will sit around waiting for some country to be moved by our situation, while warning them that the worsening of the situation will have consequences for their countries. It is extremely easy to tell other countries to do what you cannot or will not do. If those who believe that an international armed action is the solution (which it certainly is if they were working for it) then the least we can expect of them is that they act accordingly so that we Venezuelans can evaluate whether it is worth waiting for the success of that exit. When Carlos Delgado Chalbaud decided on the armed route to end the tyranny of Juan Vicente Gómez, he went to Europe, chartered a ship with weapons and crew, the famous "Falke", and did so. He failed in the attempt but he did it, he didn't start talking bullshit in the newspapers of the time, shouting that this was the solution to get out of Gomez. These things are not said, they are done. Meanwhile the rest of us, civilians who can't try anything else but civilian solutions, can't just stand by and wait for someone to grab a gun. When that happens, then we will update the picture and see where each of us stands in this new reality.

Until that happens we decide not to wait another second and move with the tools that citizens have because we have nothing else. This proposal is not a panacea but it does give the OAS countries room to maneuver and decide on their own about the Venezuelan case, given the fact that the official opposition is not giving any sign of taking a step to solve the problem in any way, and doing nothing further aggravates the situation.
The response that the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Miguel Ángel Martin Tortabú, gave to the communication that we sent to the Secretary General of the OAS, is limited to the institutional route that we seek to rescue the country (see Presidencia TSJ, Oficio No. TSJ/SP-005-2020, del 18 de Junio de 2020, en https://twitter.com/miguelmartint1/status/1273286422959730688), providing its full support, by requesting the good services of the OAS to mobilize to raise the requested issue with the OAS Permanent Council, taking "into account the constitutional legitimacy of the Venezuelan citizens who address this request". In other words, the signatories are perfectly able constitutionally to address the Organization of American States-OAS and await a response.

This is only the first step in a long institutional path that alludes to the participation of all Venezuelans in the resolution of the country's serious problem, as opposed to a political path that is sold as short but no one is encouraged to make it concrete, becoming the heartbreaking reality that is so long. Whoever believes in this should continue to wait or dare to take up a gun. Only the balance between the institutional and the political will define what will happen in Venezuela in the coming months. My feeling is that we Venezuelans will end up pushing the bus because we have stopped believing that one of the drivers who announced himself will start it. If that's the case, good for us...

Caracas, June 20, 2020

Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana

[1] Juan Ignacio Jiménez, Política y Administración, Cap. 2. Modelo Tridimensional: Instituciones, Sectores y Sistemas, 1970.

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