By Luis Manuel Aguana
The topic of a National Emergency Government (NEG) cannot be addressed without first providing context. Fundamentally, it refers to the government that would follow the removal of the Castro-Chavista-Maduro regime that has plagued Venezuela for almost 30 years.
Before the US removal of Nicolás Maduro Moros on January 3, 2026, the NEG was supposed to be the government that would follow the June 28, 2024 election, based on the assumption that the regime would respect the results—something many of us expected it would not do, as indeed happened.
Now, after the disappearance of the person who illegitimately held the presidency, and the subsequent arrival of a tutelage system imposed by those who removed him, the presidency of his successor cannot be considered a NEG because its essence does not entail the transformation of the country's previous state and the renewal of its structures, but rather its continuity, because it is precisely part of the same system.
According to the Displacement-Transition-Refounding model described in this blog (see Venezuela: Displacement, Transition and Re-foundation, in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/p/venezuela-displacement-transition-and.html), the regime that has held power since 1999 has not yet been displaced. The removal of Nicolás Maduro Moros and his wife dealt a severe blow to the regime but did not destroy it. From the perspective of its overseer—the United States—the expectation is that Maduro’s successor, Delcy Rodríguez, will dismantle the structure built over twenty-seven years in power to pave the way for a transition, prior to the country's economic recovery.
However, five months after Maduro’s disappearance—and as was to be expected—the country’s anticipated economic revival has not materialized. This is despite the "tutor's" efforts to persuade the U.S. business community to invest in a country still firmly in the hands of the very regime that destroyed the nation's institutional foundations to entrench itself permanently in power—and that disregarded vital trade agreements, leading to the loss of significant Venezuelan international assets due to legal actions against it in the U.S.
This situation has prompted the Venezuelan political sector to push for an immediate change of government via elections, without considering the timeframes required for the three phases of the U.S. plan: Stabilization, Recovery, and Transition.
The duration of each phase is undetermined, depending instead on the country's political situation and the willingness of the regime's key players to follow the tutor's orders. Consequently, the first two phases remain incomplete. The first began with changes to the Rodríguez cabinet—particularly in the Defense sector—aimed at stabilizing the regime's internal forces and aligning them with the U.S.; the second has failed to yield the expected investment results, even after amendments were made to mining and hydrocarbon laws. No one can be compelled to invest in a country still run by the same actors and accomplices associated with the man who was removed and put on trial in a New York court. Furthermore, this situation makes it impossible to initiate the third phase. From a pragmatic standpoint, holding elections under these circumstances would render the removal of Maduro entirely pointless.
Added to this is a factor that cannot be dismissed: Delcy Rodríguez has an expiration date as the Republic's acting president. July 2nd marks the end of the constitutional 90-day extension for declaring the president's absolute absence and calling for elections.
Who benefits from this situation? Certainly not the "tutor," who has repeatedly stated that Venezuela is not ready for an electoral process without first completing the first two phases of his plan. Nor does it benefit Venezuelans, because elections conducted by the regime—without changing the country's electoral system—guarantee no real change; the pillars sustaining the regime would remain intact, whereas they need to be dismantled through the effective conclusion of the first phase of the US plan. In other words, the necessary shift required to proceed to the transition phase would not occur. It is not that hard to understand...
We thus find ourselves in a situation where the only beneficiaries are political actors within the regime and the opposition—actors pushing for elections that amount to a high-stakes gamble where they are wagering not their own assets, but those of the Venezuelan people.
It appears, then, that we are inevitably heading toward a collision with the Titanic’s iceberg, with no possibility of changing course. And it is at this point that we Venezuelans must begin to demand the effects—however belated—of the coup d'état dealt to Nicolás Maduro Moros on January 3, 2026.
The US decided, on its own initiative and for its own reasons, to intervene in Venezuela's political life. Removing Maduro—even as a criminal—HAD POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. It created a vacuum that they chose to fill with his constitutional successor. They could have followed the 1989 Panama playbook by installing the president-elect whom the regime had refused to recognize, but they did not. Now the decision falls to them—having let the January 3, 2026, deadline pass without acting—to commit to a full-scale intervention and decide who will lead the country through the conclusion of the plan's first two phases. Otherwise, any progress achieved over the past five months will vanish due to the incomplete outcome of the three-phase plan, resulting from elections overseen by a regime—led by Delcy Rodríguez—from which Nicolás Maduro Moros has not been fully removed.
It is from this premise that the contextualized concept of a National Emergency Government (NEG) arises. By imposing a NEG and thereby forcing the "Displacement" phase, the U.S.—acting as the direct agent of a coup d'état in Venezuela against the head of a drug cartel—would have to appoint an NEG backed by the firepower positioned off our coasts. Following the model of the 1958 Civic-Military Junta, we propose an NEG composed of five members: two civilians, two military officers, and a fifth member selected by the other four.
This new administration would indeed function as a transitional government within the "Displacement-Transition-Refounding" framework—not the transition envisioned in the U.S. plan, but rather the period necessary to achieve the free, fair, verifiable, and—above all—authentic elections called for in the third part of that plan. It would also provide the time needed to execute the first two phases of the U.S. strategy under conditions of far greater freedom than existed under the Rodríguez administration. And why do I say this?
Because this new NEG would assume all remaining branches of government (Legislative, Judicial, Electoral, and Citizen Power), just as the 1958 Civic-Military Junta did with the institutions of that era. Without repealing the 1999 Constitution, it would establish a special new Electoral Statute to call General Elections—for the Presidency and the National Assembly—that guarantee authenticity. It would take the time required to implement necessary changes to the vote-counting system and the Electoral Registry, covering Venezuelans residing both within the country and around the world.
The NEG would be the answer to the Venezuelan people—not merely to political actors—because it would guarantee the investments needed to reactivate the country's productive sector. Furthermore, it would be backed by the force of the very entity that removed Maduro in the first place, as well as by military factions ready to protect citizens rather than persecute them. And all of that would take place as soon as possible—not according to a self-serving electoral timetable concocted by the opposition and the Rodríguez regime. The NEG would serve as the bridge between the current situation and the desired one.
As for which civilians the US might designate, simply consider those Venezuelans who offer the greatest assurances of institutional seriousness to foreign capital—particularly regarding the oil sector—and of legal certainty within Venezuela. I am certain you have a clear idea of who these individuals might be, and the US does as well. Regarding the military figures, they would be the same ones the "tutor" is currently selecting to reorganize the Venezuelan military sector.
Yet, what I consider the most important phase—not of the US plan, but of our own sequence—remains: the Refounding. The NEG (National Emergency Government) must lay the groundwork for the subsequent convening of a National Constituent Assembly, ensuring the institutional changes necessary for a new era of peace and prosperity for Venezuelans. Indeed, the call for this assembly should stem from a political agreement between the NEG and all forces contesting the country's next general elections—much like the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo. The NEG would play a pivotal political role in achieving this objective.
By now, the US must fully grasp the intricacies of Venezuelan politics—enough to realize that local political actors can derail any positive initiative the US might wish to undertake for the Venezuelan people. The solution is to outmaneuver Venezuelan politicians at their own game: staying one step ahead. Time is ticking, and it is precious for everyone. Taking the initiative will rest with the "tutor"—none other than US President Donald J. Trump. We Venezuelans will be grateful to him for it...
Caracas, June 7, 2026
Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
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