Returning to the Constituent Negotiation

By Luis Manuel Aguana

Versión en español

As the old teachers used to say, there is nothing better than tirelessly repeating a concept for it to become internalized in a person's mind. It is only when something is clearly understood that action is taken. And I believe that there is still much to be discussed in relation to something as audacious as a proposal to re-negotiate with the regime, but in very different terms.

From the interesting exchange carried out in response to the “1% Thesis” sustained by Dr. José María Rodríguez (see The 1% thesis and Constituent, in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/p/the-1-thesis-and-constituent.html), questions have arisen that merited a second meeting and expansion of the concepts expressed on that occasion (see in Spanish La tesis del 1%: Nuevo encuentro de José María Rodríguez, Luis Manuel Aguana y Jesús Domingo Ortiz, in https://youtu.be/R4J_4WalSqY). 

And those questions revolved, in the case of the Constituent Assembly, around what sense would a negotiation with those who have mocked the opposition and Venezuelans in multiple opportunities make, especially if they have already managed to stay in power behind the backs of the popular sovereignty expressed in the vote on July 28, 2024.

The first thing to answer would be, what would lead the regime to sit down again to negotiate? What would they negotiate? New sanctions? More blockades? More commercial or financial strangulation? The force of external factors? If the purpose of a new negotiation is their exit from power, let's not even try. No one sits down to negotiate the color of the panties they will wear in the prison where they will be confined. One negotiates on common interests or if one of the parties is forced to do so.

Why negotiate in a war, as in the case of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine? We could answer that they would do it to stop the killing on both sides. But if the aggressor is winning, it would not be in their interest to negotiate, but rather the terms of the opponent's surrender. Russia has gained ground in Ukraine, but there are other factors that influence its decision to negotiate, such as the intervention of European countries in that war, or the recent agreement on the exploitation of rare earths between the USA and Ukraine, which would bring that power into the conflict for a new interest on the chessboard.

Why was it possible to negotiate with the regime last time? They wanted opposition recognition and a relaxation of sanctions, and they got it. In exchange for that, they gave in to proceed with presidential elections through negotiations that took place in Barbados, despite the fact that later, within days of its signature, they protested its violation by the opposition, ignoring it in practice completely.

The Barbados Agreement is signed on October 17 and the following day, “on October 18, after the signing of the treaty, the U.S. Treasury Department issues four general licenses in which it will relieve for six months until April 18, 2024 a group of sanctions against the hydrocarbons, natural gas and gold industry of the country, as well as removing the prohibitions against secondary commercialization. The entity warned that the decision would be revoked if the Venezuelan Government does not honor its commitments in the previous day's agreement” (see in Spanish Barbados Agreement, in https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acuerdo_de_Barbados).

The regime, as has been its custom, bought time again and signed because they knew they could win with a rigged electoral system against a soft opposition that has only wanted positions. They knew they could get away with it and yet we went to this process without basic conditions because the regime ignored what was negotiated in Barbados, when María Corina Machado (MCM) swept the opposition primaries on October 22, 2023. Therefore, they prevented her registration in the CNE, in open violation of the first article of the agreement which indicated that “The Parties recognize and respect the right of each political actor to select its candidate for the presidential elections freely and according to its internal mechanisms, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the law” (see in Spanish Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All, signed in Barbados, in https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/ac03d5655a8448e0a9653cd95d5c7978/garantias-electorales.pdf).

But in our opinion, the basic problem is that if we want to negotiate a solution to the Venezuelan political crisis, a negotiation for a presidential election is not enough, which is what the parties opposing the regime have always done, since this not only maintains the political structure built to sustain the regime after 25 years, but the flawed structure of the State remains in its favor, even if it wins the presidential elections. Already at the time of Barbados it was necessary to negotiate the terms of a call for a Constituent process.

The rest is known history. The regime indicates that there was an intervention of the electoral system by the opposition on the day of the elections, declaring itself the winner of the elections, outlawing its main leader MCM and imprisoning hundreds of people who defended the opposition vote throughout the country.

Months after this election heist in Venezuela, the US, in a controversial statement on Fox News in March 2025, by its main international spokesman, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, indicated that the Venezuelan problem can only be solved with clean elections: “The future of Venezuela belongs to the Venezuelan people. The solution is a legitimate, observed, democratic election, which has not occurred” (see in Spanish Marco Rubio bets on new elections in Venezuela, March 14, 2025, in https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2025/03/14/67d4a429fdddff16968b45cb.html).

However, the US has always repeated the same thing: that the problem must be solved by Venezuelans, and the only way to do so, according to their criteria, is through elections, since this is the only way they know how to allow the people to express themselves. Hence, it is necessary to explain to the United States and the world that in Venezuela there is another way out other than elections for public office.

How else can we achieve that “the future of Venezuela belongs to the Venezuelan people” if we do not summon the very basis of popular sovereignty, whose maximum expression is found in the Original Power established in the Constitution? That is what must be explained in detail to Marco Rubio and to any other top international political exponent. And that electoral call cannot be for an election of offices, even for the election of the President of the Republic. Again, the tiresome repetition once more: the electoral expression must be to call and elect the legitimate representatives of the Venezuelan people in a Constituent election, through the initiatives established in the 1999 Constitution.

But how can we bring the regime back to the table to discuss that? By upping the ante. I believe that they could sit down if international recognition is offered to the Transition Government that emerges from the decision of the legitimate representation of the Venezuelan people in a Constituent Assembly where all the forces, including the pro-government ones, would participate. And that this Constituent should be arbitrated by an equitable representation of all the factors in conflict under the electoral administration of international organizations.

Under what terms? To discuss and materialize in a text of the Electoral Bases that defines who and how a new “ad-hoc” electoral arbiter will operate, different from the CNE and supervised by international organizations, the times of such Constituent until the promulgation of a new Constitution, the scope of such call and the participation of all the sectors of the national life, not only the political ones. Only in this way could Marco Rubio's proposal for an electoral solution be viable.

Clearly, it would be necessary to go out and propose this solution to the world, but unfortunately, the foreign policy of the opposition does not exist, because there is no opposition government in office since Edmundo González Urrutia (EGU) has not been officially sworn in. And since this does not exist, the governments have only recognized Nicolás Maduro Moros as President in Venezuela, in spite of the real results of July 28. The persecution unleashed after that day has diminished the activism of the parties and has prevented the demonstration and organic regrouping of the opposition in the country.

MCM tries, without having a vertebrate party, to agglutinate a force that is only effective around the electoral issue. Without this force it is not possible to reach a solution to the crisis, because the positions have been radicalized. Hence, the same force that succeeded in making the regime sit down in Barbados is required, but with a new proposal, which in our opinion cannot be other than negotiating the terms for a Constituent Assembly of the people, with new negotiators on both sides.

To the question, can Venezuela be remade through a Constituent Assembly? Yes, I believe so. Venezuela is living a Constituent Moment that cannot be hidden or concealed by the political leadership, and that only occurs when the unobjectionable need arises to remake the political fabric after a catastrophe such as the one suffered by Venezuela (see in Spanish Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Ruina de la Democracia, Elección Presidencial y Momento Constituyente 2024, in https://tinyurl.com/365h2jb8).

But this requires the reestablishment of the constitutional order with a clear political solution in hand. Without this, it is not possible to rescue the economy because there is no north to lead the country. Seneca said that there is no favorable wind for a ship that does not know where it is going. And only true politicians can set the course that has been lost. Hopefully there are still some left...

Caracas, May 24, 2025

Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/

Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com

X (Twitter): @laguana

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