By Luis
Manuel Aguana
In the utterly nebulous climate currently prevailing in Venezuela—where it is impossible to discern whether or not we are truly on the right path—the political establishment continues to clamor for elections. Are elections a good or bad thing if the U.S. three-phase plan has yet to be completed? Should Venezuelans sit idly by, with their arms crossed, when their sovereignty has been forcibly wrested into the hands of a foreign power—even if that power happens to be the United States? Are there any truth to the warnings suggesting that, should the conflict in the Middle East escalate, the U.S. will never allow Venezuelans to exercise free and proper control over their own oil resources?
These questions—along with a host of others—suggest that the political limbo in which we find ourselves is merely one phase of a transition that, while certainly having begun on January 3rd, shows no signs of reaching a conclusion in the short term—or even the medium term—particularly when viewed against the backdrop of the world's current critical geopolitical landscape.
Regrettably, the only solution our woefully backward political class seems capable of conceiving is the belief that all our ills will be resolved simply by electing the most popular candidate in a vote—the conditions for which remain completely unsecured on every front. One need only observe that the "man of the napkin" from July 28, 2024—along with the rest of the CNE directors—remains comfortably entrenched in his post, presiding over an automated system and a body of electoral legislation that remain utterly unchanged and, effectively, a complete farce.
However, the problem runs much deeper. Delcy Rodríguez has a genuine expiration date. The Constitution imposes this limit upon her—even though the country and the interim president currently find themselves under the tutelage of the United States, a result of an act of force in which the military capitulated to that power during an undeclared war that lasted less than two hours on January 3, 2026.
According to Article 234 of the Constitution: “Temporary absences of the President of the Republic shall be filled by the Executive Vice President for a period of up to ninety days, extendable by decision of the National Assembly for up to an additional ninety days. If a temporary absence extends for more than ninety consecutive days, the National Assembly shall decide, by a majority vote of its members, whether such absence shall be deemed an absolute absence.”
I do not believe that the National Assembly—controlled by the interim president’s brother—will declare an absolute absence on the part of Nicolás Maduro Moros until his sentence is definitively determined by the court currently trying him in New York. If we look to the history of a similar trial—that of Manuel Noriega in the United States—the proceedings lasted approximately seven months, commencing on September 6, 1991, and concluding with a guilty verdict on April 9, 1992, in Miami, Florida.
Based on an approximate calculation using those dates, the results suggest that—assuming Delcy Rodríguez is granted the necessary extensions until the New York court issues a verdict against Maduro—the declaration of an "absolute vacancy" would fall in February 2027. This calculation takes into account that the 90-day statutory period (plus her extension) expires on July 3rd, and adds approximately seven additional months for Maduro's trial proceedings. Consequently, this timeline would leave the Rodríguez siblings with a constitutional obligation to call for elections by March or April of 2027 at the very latest.
However, this represents the purely constitutional aspect of the matter. Nevertheless, it remains possible that the call for elections could take place as early as this year, provided that Maduro's trial is significantly expedited. Everything will depend on the substantive strength of the case against him and whether the evidence presented is sufficiently conclusive to allow for a relatively swift verdict.
Maduro's defense attorneys have filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the defendant is unable to cover the costs of his legal defense. As is widely known, the lawyers representing Maduro are among the most expensive in the specialized field of defending high-level criminal defendants; indeed, it is highly unlikely that the accused possesses the means to pay for his defense using funds derived from any source other than the very crimes of which he stands accused.
But I ask myself: isn't this entire trial already costing American taxpayers a fortune—including military transport, the deployment of assault troops for the extraction of Maduro, and a whole fleet of armed vessels to the coast of Venezuela, not to mention DEA agents—just to cite the most obvious examples? Do you really believe that the presiding judge would balk at the minuscule costs of a public defender—especially when compared to everything that has already been spent—and dismiss a trial that is, by all appearances, absolutely essential to the United States, simply because the lawyers have no way to collect their exorbitant fees? Please—spare us the insult to our intelligence! Maduro and his inner circle would have to be idiots—which they are not—to think such a thing.
But let us return to the situation regarding the interim president. The appointment of a public defender would delay Maduro’s case, as the new defense attorneys would have to build the accused’s defense from scratch. This would add even more time to the overall process of declaring an "absolute vacancy" in the presidency—pushing it beyond March or April 2027, as we previously noted—assuming, of course, that Maduro’s trial takes approximately as long as that of Manuel Noriega, which serves as the basis for the calculations in this analysis.
However, some of us are left wondering whether any elections will actually take place after that period. Yes, the Constitution—which has been flagrantly violated by the regime for the past 27 years—stipulates that, in the event of an "absolute vacancy" in the presidency (projected to occur around 2027), presidential elections must be called. Yet, strictly speaking—and considering what the Constitution would *actually* mandate following Delcy Rodríguez’s tenure, once that "absolute vacancy" is officially declared—shouldn’t the next step be the recognition of the election results from July 28, 2024, and the swearing-in of Edmundo González Urrutia as President of the Republic, with all that such an act entails?
Well, it seems that political factions across the spectrum are now averse to that option and are calling for elections following a declaration of Maduro’s absolute absence from office. However, the problem remains that we are still beholden to the decision of our guardian—the United States—which, by virtue of a war won on January 3rd, is currently exercising actual power in Venezuela. It could very well—while maintaining the constitutional appearances of the matter—prolong the tenure of Delcy Rodríguez, or some other figure convenient to its interests, in the presidency of the Republic.
And that is precisely the point I wished to make. We are not discussing democracy here, nor the self-determination of the Venezuelan people. Rather, we are speaking of a pure and unadulterated regency exercised by one State—the United States—over another: Venezuela. This reality would be openly and unequivocally unmasked before the Venezuelan people when the moment truly arrives to decide whether or not elections are to be held—elections which, pragmatically speaking, would only take place if they served the immediate interests of that foreign power. At that juncture, we will be compelled to make decisions regarding the stance we ought to adopt in the face of this situation: should we accept this regency, or should we resist it?
Thus far, this remains a topic left unspoken, for we have yet to emerge from the hangover following the celebration of Maduro’s departure from Venezuela and the commencement of the regime’s dismantling of socialism. But once the hangover lifts, we must return to our daily lives—however imperfect they may be. Only we can decide whether, once the hangover has passed, we prefer to remain under tutelage or external management, or whether we will step to the forefront to reclaim our self-determination. Chávez, Maduro, and their "21st-century socialism" dragged us into a war that was not our own, and these are the consequences. We could choose to live under tutelage, naively "waiting" for an electoral process—triggered solely by Maduro’s absolute absence—to restore our sovereignty. But what we cannot do is leave that decision in limbo, waiting for it to fall from the sky—relying solely on the "disinterested" intentions of a foreign power. That will be our next challenge…
Caracas, March 26, 2026
Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email:
luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario