By Luis Manuel Aguana
Undoubtedly, the most politically significant event in the country this week was the return of María Corina Machado (MCM) to Venezuela. This development was to be expected; beyond its newsworthiness, it had become a necessity for her—regardless of whether or not she had the blessing of the United States.
Political leadership is not static. It shifts in response to the dynamics of the domestic and international political landscape, and in politics, there is no such thing as a vacuum. Many might argue that MCM is irreplaceable, but I disagree. Every politician is replaceable; the real question is the circumstances under which such a replacement occurs. We Venezuelans have witnessed this ourselves. Just look back: first there was Manuel Rosales, then Henrique Capriles, followed by Leopoldo López, and later Juan Guaidó. None of them had staying power; time and the specific conditions of the country’s politics eventually removed them, one by one. This is not a static photograph—it is a film on the scale of a Hollywood blockbuster.
Had MCM waited any longer without being able to exert some influence over the events that will define Venezuela’s future, she would have been left out of the process entirely.
In my view, her return did not have the Trump administration’s blessing—which is hardly surprising. They wanted—and still want—her as far away as possible, to prevent her from negatively impacting their three-phase plan. Officially, they always maintained that they had not intervened to block her return and that she was free to come back whenever she chose—at least until she took the initiative to return without permission.
I believe this is what she should have done from the very beginning, as no one needs anyone else’s permission to enter their own country. The issue was that she had hoped for a red carpet and a press entourage, wanting to rub it in the regime’s face that she was entering through the front door with American backing. It is fortunate that she finally realized the U.S. and the regime—entangled as they are in their own negotiations—were not yet ready for such a scenario. The return of MCM to Venezuela raises major questions, which the unfolding of events will soon clarify. The first of these is: What will MCM do once she is in the country? Against whom will she position her opposition? It is quite clear that Delcy Rodríguez is the Trump administration’s key asset for bringing about the changes they intend to implement following the removal of Maduro on January 3, 2026. For better or worse, Delcy and her regime are the protégés of Trump and Rubio—at least until they deem the dismantling of *Castro-Chavismo-Madurismo* to be complete.
Recent statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio support this assertion. In a recent teleconference, Rubio spoke at length with Marc Caputo of the news outlet Axios; his remarks regarding Delcy Rodríguez leave no doubt as to what they intend to do with her.
“All right, let me go back to your question on Delcy. Yeah, I don’t think Delcy’s ever pronounced herself in favor of the operation that happened on January 3rd. That said, so far this process – how do we judge all this? We ultimately judge it not by rhetoric but by action, okay? And the actions are as follows: We have asked them to do certain things that are in the interest of the national security of the United States, and they have done them – some of which I’m not going to disclose or talk about here, but they’ve done them. I can – suffice it to say that today the influence of Iranians and Cubans in Venezuela is – and others is substantially diminished, if not eliminated.
They’ve – we’ve asked them to go after criminal organizations, and they’ve done it. We’ve asked them to deport individuals wanted by the justice system of the United States, like Alex Saab, and they’ve extradited him, and today he’s pled guilty and is now a cooperating witness in our system. We’ve asked them to make sure that this transition process moves forward, and they’re doing it. I mean, these agreements, they’ve agreed to them. They’ve agreed to the new TSJ. They’ve agreed to this moving forward.
So, I think the question about trust – look, trust is – it’s not based on rhetoric. It’s going to be based on actions. At the end of the day, that’s really what we care about. If at the end of the day we have a new TSJ, a new CNE, a new election, and a new system of government, that’s what we want. And no matter what people say along the way, as long as it happens, this is a results-based process. And so far, frankly, on everything we’ve asked for in this process, be it the economic reforms, the political reforms, it’s happening. And we think that’s good and that’s cooperative, irrespective of the other things that are happening” (see Press Release, Departament of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Venezuela, october 26, 2026, in https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/10/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-on-venezuela/)
In other words, as long as the Rodríguezes hold up their end of the bargain, they will remain.
Consequently, MCM will need to carefully gauge the opposition to Delcy (i.e., the Trump-Rubio camp)—especially given that the U.S. is moving, slowly but surely, to dismantle the apparatus that has destroyed Venezuela over the course of almost 30 years.
On the other hand, will MCM attempt to exert influence over the faction of the opposition that betrayed her in Panama—a group led by Dinorah Figuera, who is working closely with the U.S. as the opposition’s chief negotiator? I don’t think so, particularly since she has stated that she does not wish to be involved in those negotiations. This shields her from any failure—or success—that may result from those agreements. Should they prove successful, she will be one of the primary beneficiaries.
That leaves the electoral front: her tours across the country and her potential presidential candidacy for elections that may emerge from the agreements between the 2025 National Assembly (AN-2025) and the 2015 National Assembly (AN-2015). However, regardless of how much pressure is applied to hold elections by mid-2027, the final decision will rest with the Trump administration, in accordance with its own timeline. On this point, during the aforementioned teleconference, Rubio was quite clear in his response to a question from *The Wall Street Journal*’s Vera Bergengruen:
VB: …. So, you’ve laid out all these conditions that need to be met, obviously, before Venezuela can hold elections. But what prevents the current government from – it’s a lot, and obviously, as you said, it takes a really long time for all of this to kind of fall into place. What prevents the current government from using these requirements to delay elections indefinitely? And how would Washington use its leverage, as you’ve mentioned, to prevent that?
MR: Well, I mean, what prevents them from doing it is the fact that – let me put it to you this way. I think your question really is, well, how do we know that this is not a delay tactic? Like, what if they just try to wait us out for two years? That’s not going to happen. I mean, we have timelines that are agreed to, and so far, they’ve met every one of the timelines” (see Press Release, Departament of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Venezuela, october 26, 2026, previously referenced).
Rubio’s reference to “we have timelines that are agreed to” is significant. These timelines must necessarily encompass what Rubio himself stated in response to Olivia Gazis of CBS—namely, the need to overhaul the country’s electoral infrastructure in order to hold elections, rather than simply appointing new electoral officials. “You’ve got to change the infrastructure of the elections – not in 10 years, not in five years, not in two years; it needs to happen quickly under the timelines that we’ve established. And I think we’re making real progress in that regard” (see Press Release, Departament of State, Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Venezuela, october 26, 2026, previously referenced).
This is reinforced by statements from a senior State Department official, made on the same day as Rubio’s teleconference:
“Venezuela and the Maduro regime then proceeded to have an election in 2024, but they had an election with the old TSJ, with the old CNE; in essence, with the existing infrastructure. You cannot have a free and fair election that is accepted by both sides and all sides in a country as long as that infrastructure is in place. So that infrastructure needs to be replaced. That infrastructure needs to be ripped out and replaced with something new. You can’t have credible elections in that country without that in place.” …. “If we did an election with the current infrastructure of that country – they know how to run – I mean, they have electoral machines. They can set up polling places and do another election next month, but it won’t be a fair election, and it won’t be a free election….Added to all of that is the atmospherics. You can’t really have a credible election in a country – even if you have a new CNE, even if you have a new TSJ, you cannot have an election in a country if political parties are not allowed to form and operate, if they’re not allowed to campaign, if you don’t have a free press that they can have access to, if you don’t have the opportunities to access the airwaves of the country, if you don’t have access to Instagram and X and whatever else they want to use on social media to communicate with voters and so forth, if candidates aren’t able to move freely through the country.” (see Press Release, Departament of State, Senior State Department Official on Venezuela, october 26,2026, in https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/10/senior-state-department-official-on-venezuela/).
I cannot overstate the importance of these statements. If they initiate this process following the appointment of the new Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ)—by mid-December 2026 at the latest, as they have stated—the technical transformation would begin in January 2027. This would imply that the date for elections remains unspecified, as it would depend directly on the transformation of the National Electoral Council (CNE) into a technical and apolitical institution, as noted in the statement from the senior official.
“The CNE will now become basically a technical platform. It will remove all of the – all the political aspects of the CNE, meaning they’re no longer going to be in a position to remove candidates from the ballot or decide who gets to run or who doesn’t get to run. Their sole job will be equivalent to what our elections departments do in the United States in our respective counties in the 50 states and territories, and that is they’re the people that put out the machines, count the votes, open the polling places, count the votes and report the results. And it will be a nonpolitical CNE” (see Press Release, Departament of State, Senior State Department Official on Venezuela, october 26,2026, previously referenced).
A structural transformation of the kind mentioned does not happen in a month or two; it would have to be factored into the electoral timeline. In total, we are looking at a period of at least a year—following the decision to overhaul the Venezuelan electoral ecosystem (its technical, legal, and procedural frameworks)—before a fair, free, and verifiable election could take place. Consequently, an election held by mid-2027 would lack credibility. Meanwhile, Delcy and the rest of the regime would remain in power.
If the only issue were waiting for elections, that might be acceptable. But the reality is that the situation in Venezuela—the daily lives of its people—is deteriorating further with every passing hour that these criminals remain in power. It is not just a matter of María Corina Machado (MCM) running an electoral campaign until the elections arrive; there is an urgent need for a clear message and concrete proposals for *today*—not for a year or more down the line—especially when so many Venezuelan lives could be at stake. Yes, lives. Consider the ongoing plight of those affected by earthquakes, the crisis in the healthcare system, and a host of other issues—such as the state of the power grid, upon which so many people depend.
Somehow, the indefinite, illegitimate grip on power held by Delcy Rodríguez must be addressed through a genuine transition—one that aligns with the vision proposed by the U.S. State Department, under the leadership of Marco Rubio.
This is why it is so urgent to reach an agreement with the United States on a transition *without* Delcy Rodríguez, pending the eventual holding of elections. In my view, this is a matter of statecraft that can only be led, from the opposition side, by the Nobel Prize winner María Corina Machado. She should seek and support negotiated solutions with the U.S.—such as the formation of a transitional governing council—in which she herself does not hold a seat. Only in this way could such an arrangement be considered credible.
This would not mean opposing the U.S. three-phase plan; quite the contrary—it would be a way to ensure the plan’s success. It would necessarily involve elements of the current regime—those currently in power—within a joint, transitional framework between the government and the opposition, sanctioned by a legitimate Supreme Court (TSJ), much like what has occurred during transitions in many other parts of the world. It would amount to a mutually agreed-upon adjustment to the U.S. plan, implemented as the process unfolds. The issue is not Delcy Rodríguez herself—as the U.S. might mistakenly perceive—but rather her status as an illegitimate ruler who lacks any mandate from the Venezuelan people, part of a highly dangerous regime that no one in Venezuela trusts. That is what this is really about.
If MCM were to dedicate her efforts to that task—instead of traveling the country for the umpteenth time in search of votes she has already secured—she would do far more to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan people NOW than she could months or even longer from now, when she might finally be elected president. If she chooses not to do so, at least we Venezuelans will know where we stand…
Caracas, October 28, 2026
Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email:
luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
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