By Luis Manuel Aguana
To understand what is happening in Venezuela today, one must first grasp that the Donald Trump administration is exercising coercion over the country, not tutelage. This constitutes a daily, direct, and constant threat against those holding power in Venezuela, as well as against any opposition faction with skeletons in the closet and open corruption cases in the United States.
I explained this in greater detail a few days ago in my previous post from August 7. Nevertheless, people continue to call on the U.S. to take actions—such as ousting Delcy and her interim administration—that lie beyond its legal scope of action (specifically, legal action within the U.S.). Such measures would only be feasible if the U.S. had actually invaded Venezuela with an AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) from Congress, just as it did with Iraq in 2003 (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002) (see Venezuela: The Force of coercion, in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/p/venezuela-force-of-coercion.html).
If one pays a little attention to the foregoing, it becomes clear why the regime continues to operate as if Maduro were still in power. What turns this coercion into tutelage is that—driven by a credible threat hanging over both the regime and the opposition—they are walking hand-in-hand down the same path, even though the vast majority of Venezuelans flatly reject it.
And that is not all. This explains why Delcy remains in her post and why the U.S. has no way to remove her other than by physically taking her away, just as they did with Maduro. Otherwise, they—like the rest of us Venezuelans—are forced to endure the convoluted procedures for her replacement dictated by the warped institutional framework that still remains in Venezuela.
But there is an even more serious aspect to this. As long as Delcy Rodríguez and the rest of the "extractables"—a term we can use for those living under the same looming Sword of Damocles that fell on Maduro, much like Colombian drug lords were labeled "extraditables"—remain in office, the U.S. can exert some control over them. Once that situation ends—whether they are taken away or leave power with U.S. consent—the Trump Administration will be unable, due to its own institutional constraints, to exert any influence over what follows in Venezuela or over its future rulers.
With this clarification, we can understand why María Corina Machado (MCM) is not at that "Dialogue Table": she is impervious to coercion (at least in the terms that make the others susceptible to it), and would therefore pose a predictable obstacle to the Table's plans.
By the same token, this explains why the U.S. cannot push any harder than it already has for the release of the remaining political prisoners; after all, the very people who inherited Maduro’s regime are the ones most keenly aware of the limits of American power in Venezuela. Trump and Rubio prefer to dance that close tango with the regime to ultimately get what they want from Venezuela, opting to woo Delcy Rodríguez and her clique peacefully rather than applying excessive pressure that might force them to make good on the threats hanging over the regime—and lose control of the country.
The regime is aware of this. They also know they cannot simply get rid of the interim president and the rest of the repressive apparatus immediately—or at least not in the same way Maduro was removed; rather, the only way to oust them is by waiting for the institutional channels currently being forged through the two Assemblies. Consequently, the idea that many held—and some still hold—that the US should immediately oust the interim government is not a viable option for the Trump administration.
By setting in motion a mechanism that maintains direct pressure on those targeted for removal, the US gives the impression to the rest of the world that it is exercising the kind of tutelage seen in countries it has invaded in the past; in reality, however, it is merely maneuvering threatened pieces across a constrained institutional landscape. While one might argue that the net result is the same—equating a concrete threat with direct oversight—the scope of actual action is limited by the institutional realities of both Venezuela and the United States.
To succeed in this game, the regime must cooperate far more than it has so far, while stalling Washington’s directives as much as possible. The strategy of combining two illegitimate National Assemblies to achieve a legitimate outcome is, in fact, a long and pothole-ridden path; it affords the regime ample room to control the appointment processes for both the Supreme Court (TSJ) and the National Electoral Council (CNE) using the same methods it has always employed.
Many might argue that, given US involvement in ensuring transparency regarding the appointments of TSJ magistrates and CNE rectors, the outcome will reflect a negotiation between parties that have colluded in the past. Ultimately, the US is unlikely to object to decisions made by "independent" nomination committees—committees that have historically been controlled by the parties of the National Assembly, a body now diluted by the inclusion of a historically compliant "opposition."
Ultimately, what is the U.S. interest? That the chosen path leads to elections—regardless of how they are reached—and that Venezuelans accept the result without protest. That would be fine if there were guarantees regarding the departure of what remains of Nicolás Maduro Moros’s regime. But unfortunately, there is no such guarantee—only the word of certain "opposition" negotiators who cite the alleged oversight of the U.S. as their assurance.
As we approach November—the date of the U.S. midterm elections—the Trump administration’s strategy regarding Venezuela becomes more complex. By then, the "Negotiation Table" between the two assemblies should have finalized decisions on changes involving the Supreme Court (TSJ) and the National Electoral Council (CNE). If this process faces no setbacks, allowing President Trump to maintain the pressure he exerts on the "extractables" [regime figures vulnerable to U.S. legal action] after the midterms, Venezuelans might reach an electoral process with the guarantee that the U.S. will enforce the result.
However, if the U.S. president ceases to exert that pressure on the "extractables"—perhaps due to a new Congress hostile to his administration—Delcy Rodríguez’s regime will manipulate any election in Venezuela using an unchanged automated electoral system, just as they always did under Chávez and Maduro. The U.S. would then have no choice but to accept the result, having chosen this path for Venezuela itself.
This makes it essential to immediately discuss a new electoral system for Venezuela—one based on manual voting, a thorough cleanup of the electoral roll, and the inclusion of the Venezuelan diaspora—yet, to our knowledge, no technical commission is currently working on this. If they haven't even begun the work needed for implementation under a new CNE board—which has not yet been appointed, and for which a nominations committee does not even exist—do you still believe the U.S. is exercising oversight in Venezuela? It is time to wake up to reality and pray that Trump and the Republicans come out on top in November…
Caracas, August 26, 2026
Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/
Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com
Twitter:@laguana
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