Venezuela: Transition, risks, and future scenarios

Note summary image courtesy of AI Google Gemini

By Luis Manuel Aguana

Versión en español

Initial remarks from the discussion entitled “Political analysis of the current situation in Venezuela and possible scenarios in the short and medium term” held with Dr. José María Rodríguez and Dr. Jesús Domingo Ortiz on November 28, 2025

(watch full video in Spanish at https://tinyurl.com/3w768bpt)

Good morning, everyone. Thank you for the invitation, José María and Jesús Domingo.

In recent years, Venezuela has entered a critical phase in its political and social history. Various analyses, both national and international, agree that the country is at a turning point where the decisions that are made—or imposed—will define the coming decades. The posts I have recently published on my blog, “The dilemma of the Venezuelan transition” (see note in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/p/the-dilemma-of-venezuelas-transition.html) and “Venezuela at its final crossroads” ((see note in https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/p/venezuela-at-its-final-crossroads.html) explore, from different perspectives, the challenges, dangers, and possibilities that accompany a possible change of power in the country.

I have publicly expressed the same fundamental concern: Venezuela's extreme institutional fragility. For years, the country has operated without real checks and balances, without legitimate public authorities, and with a state structure infiltrated by criminal networks, external interests, and armed groups that exert territorial influence. Any transition, even one backed internationally, would face an environment where opposing military factions, politicized security structures, criminal organizations, and external actors with their own interests coexist.

This context becomes even more complex given the possibility of international intervention or an abrupt change in the regime. Studies carried out by analysis centers such as Crisis Group, simulations by the US government, and assessments by publications such as Foreign Affairs and the New York Times all agree in warning of a scenario of high instability following the departure of Nicolás Maduro Moros. These exercises describe a country where, in the event of a forced change, different factions would compete to fill the power vacuum left by the regime. This dispute could lead to armed clashes, territorial chaos, and a significant increase in violence.

One of the most frequently cited factors is internal fragmentation within the Venezuelan Armed Forces. Although some sectors could support a new government, others would oppose it or attempt to preserve their power structures. Analyses indicate that this fracture would make it difficult to sustain a transition without unified military support or the presence of external forces capable of stabilizing the country during the process. However, the United States has insisted that, although it has the capacity to carry out precision operations, it has no intention of maintaining troops on Venezuelan territory to support a transitional government. This leaves a significant gap in the security equation.

Adding to this scenario is the presence of multiple armed groups with regional influence—from urban collectives to transnational guerrillas—that could take advantage of a power vacuum to expand their control. Prolonged deinstitutionalization has allowed the formation of complex networks of illicit economy and social control, making any attempt to restore order an extremely delicate task.

In this context, the question arises as to how to legitimize a transition process that will allow the country to be rebuilt on a firm foundation. It is here that ANCO has proposed, in two communiqués, one on October 6 (see in Spanish Comunicado ANCO 06-10-2025 en https://ancoficial.blogspot.com/2025/10/comunicado-la-alianza-nacional.html) and another on November 17 (see in Spanish Comunicado ANCO 17-11-2025, en  https://ancoficial.blogspot.com/2025/11/comunicado-anco-propuesta-para-una.html), the need for an Original National Constituent Assembly as a mechanism to return power to the citizenry and establish new institutional rules. This proposal is based on the recognition that no current institution has sufficient legitimacy to lead or supervise a process of profound transformation. However, even this path would require minimum conditions of security, political agreements, and a peaceful environment that do not exist today.

Beyond technical analyses, there is a human element that I have already made public: the collective fatigue of the Venezuelan people. After more than two decades of economic, social, and political deterioration, a significant portion of the population perceives any outcome as preferable to the current stagnation. This sentiment, while understandable, contrasts with experts' warnings about the risks of an abrupt collapse.

My conclusion: Where can Venezuela go from here?

Venezuela's immediate future depends on factors that transcend traditional politics. If political change occurs without planning, without agreements, and without structures capable of guaranteeing security in the short term, the country may face a phase of violence and competition between armed actors, jeopardizing any attempt to consolidate a democratic government. The medium and long term depend on this.

However, if the various actors—both internal and external—manage to coordinate their efforts, establish security guarantees, and pave the way for institutional reconstruction based on constitutional legitimacy, Venezuela could begin a process of recovery. It would not be immediate or easy, but it would lay the foundations for a functional state oriented toward the well-being of its citizens.

The coming years will be decisive. The only thing that is clear is that Venezuela has reached a point where decisions must be made. The outcome is not yet determined, but it will depend on the collective ability to avoid violent collapse and build a transition process that responds to the real complexity of the country. But above all, even knowing all this, I am sure that Venezuelans will be able to take the risk of an unstable country. We have already done so for more than 25 years...

Thank you very much...

Caracas, November 29, 2025

Blog: TIC’s & Derechos Humanos, https://ticsddhh.blogspot.com/

Email: luismanuel.aguana@gmail.com

Twitter:@laguana

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